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12.15 Example of a PWR simulation     161





                  12.14 PWR safety systems
                  PWRs are operated so as to avoid accidents. But the probability of an accident is not
                  zero. Consequently, PWRs employ a “defense-in-depth” design approach and build
                  engineered safety systems into the plant.
                     The defense-in-depth approach is to incorporate multiple barriers to prevent
                  release of radionuclides into the environment. The first barrier is the UO 2 fuel pellet.
                  UO 2 contains most of the radionuclides. The migration of radionuclides into the gas
                  space inside the fuel pin increases as fuel temperature increases. But the high melting
                  point of the UO 2 (around 5000°F) reduces total release relative to the total release as
                  would occur upon melting.
                     The second barrier is the Zircaloy cladding (sheath). It contains the radionuclides
                  that have leaked into the gap between the sheath and the fuel pellets, unless high tem-
                  perature or high internal pressure causes failure of the cladding. It must be noted that
                  melting of Zircaloy (melting point of Zircaloy-4 is 3360°F) causes a new problem:
                  hydrogen production from the reaction between liquid zirconium and water. Hydro-
                  gen is a serious explosion hazard.
                     The third barrier is the primary system piping and vessels.
                     The fourth barrier is the containment building.
                     The engineered safety systems serve to limit temperature and pressure increases.
                     PWRs employ water injection systems to provide continued cooling of the fuel in
                  the event of a loss of primary coolant. Separate systems provide cooling water for
                  pipe breaks ranging from small leaks (with continuing full or partial primary pres-
                  sure) to complete loss of coolant (with complete primary system depressurization).
                     Containment cooling engineered systems limit containment pressure. They use a
                  water spray system or stored ice to reduce temperature and pressure in the
                  containment.
                     Electrical power is required to operate safety systems in the event of an accident
                  in Generation II and III reactors. Backup systems (batteries and Diesel generators)
                  provide power in the event of loss of off-site power. Failure of emergency power
                  systems during an accident is catastrophic in these systems. New designs avoid
                  the need for electrically-driven emergency cooling systems by employing emer-
                  gency cooling that is gravity-driven or provided by flow from a pressurized tank.




                  12.15 Example of a PWR simulation
                  Appendix J describes two lumped parameter models of a PWR plant [5]. It includes a
                  simple, linearized reactor core model and a complete nonlinear model for the pri-
                  mary and secondary components.
                     This chapter provides several simulation results for the linearized reactor core
                  model from Appendix J. The model includes neutronics and core heat transfer (no
                  representation of steam generators or BOP). Available input disturbances in a
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