Page 130 - Electrical Safety of Low Voltage Systems
P. 130

TT Grounding System      113


                                  FIGURE 6.21 Two
                                  dielectric joints
                                  configuration.

                                  bonding should take place downstream of the joint so as to not com-
                                  promise the cathodic protection of the pipe. The dielectric joint is not
                                  under the user’s control, even if installed on his/her premises. A util-
                                  ity might, therefore, remove it without warning the client of the hazard
                                  of having an ECP not equipotentialized in the building.
                                     The dielectric joint prevents stray currents, impressed by foreign
                                  systems and flowing through any underground metal work, from
                                  causing the energization of the pipe in the customer’s premises. Such
                                  energization is potentially dangerous if it involves a piece of equip-
                                  ment fuelled by natural gas.
                                     There is a further safety issue introduced by the insulating joint
                                  caused by the separation of the metal pipe in two parts. The two ex-
                                  tremities, in fact, may be at different potentials upon faults. A potential
                                  difference between the two segments is a hazard for persons simul-
                                  taneously touching them. For this reason, the joint should be at least
                                  2 m long, or two joints should be used instead of one (Fig. 6.21).


                             6.11 Supplementary Equipotential Bonding
                                  Areas containing baths, showers, or pools provide a further shock
                                  risk due to the presence of water and humidity. Moisture, in fact,
                                  by decreasing the human body resistance to values below the ones
                                  shown in Table 5.2, may cause protective devices, designed to operate
                                  in standard situations, not to be effective. In bathrooms, both hot and
                                  cold taps are EXCPs and belong to different systems; therefore, they
                                  may be subject to potential differences under fault conditions.
                                     To decrease the hazard in these areas at increased electrical risk,
                                  all EXCPs, within the reach of ECPs, must be bonded to a local sup-
                                  plementary ground bus (Fig. 6.22).
                                     The supplementary bonding (SB), consisting of extra connections
                                  between ECPs and EXCPs at a more local level, does not substitute
                                  for the MEB. The MEB is made by the PEs originating from the main
                                  grounding bus and linking all the ECPs and EXCPs. The SB “rein-
                                  forces,” and does not replace, the equipotentiality already created by
                                  the MEB.



                             6.12 Potential Differences Among Metal Parts in Fault
                                   Conditions in TT Systems
                                  The previous sections allow an important consideration on the po-
                                  tentials attained by metal parts in fault conditions. As exemplified in
   125   126   127   128   129   130   131   132   133   134   135