Page 84 - Failure Analysis Case Studies II
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                         Fig. 9.  This lack-of-fusion/slag flaw on the fusion line had extended about 500 pm by creep. Where it grew
                         into the HAZ, it grew into fine-grained  material, and there was a very high density of creep rupture voids.
                         (The darker material on the right is weld metal.) (Nital etch, bright field.)


                                                    5.  DISCUSSION
                     5.1.  Age of the X-side tee crack
                       The oxide on the faces of the crack in Fig. 3 is about 60pm thick. This oxide thickness can be
                     compared with that in the bore, and can be used to estimate the time during which this cracking
                     has been open to the bore of the pipe. A model of hyperbolic growth of the oxide gives the oxide
                     thickness, x, at time t as

                                                       x  = Kt'I2.                            (1)
                       For the pipe bore, x, on average, is 160 pm, and t is 204,000 h. Therefore, we have
                                            K  = x/t'/' = 160/(204,000)'12pm h-'I2.           (2)
                     The time taken to grow a 60 pm thick oxide layer, as inside the crack, is then
                                          tso = (60/K)' = (60/160)2204,000 = 26,690 h.        (3)
                       It seems, therefore,  that the almost through-wall crack  on the X  side of the tee, having been
                     initiated in mid-wall coarse-grained zones in the HAZ, only broke through to the bore surface about
                     20,000 or 30,000 h before that cracking was discovered.

                     5.2.  Piping support and stress analysis
                       In conjunction with the material examinations, the pipe support structure was reviewed in detail.
                     The analysis of the pipe supports, hanger settings, and stresses for the in-service piping systems was
                     complicated by hangers that were not functioning, and by a lack of information on the original cold
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