Page 81 - Fundamentals of Magnetic Thermonuclear Reactor Design

64 Fundamentals of Magnetic Thermonuclear Reactor Design

The ITER siting in the south of France determined the nuclear, radiation,
engineering and fire safety and accident prevention criteria by which the reactor
design was planned. They were based on the French RCC-MR design rules for
ITER mechanical components and RCC-E codes for its electrical systems. The
main document governing the reactor quality assurance in France is the French
Quality Order. Its provisions are in line with the IAEA regulatory documents and
are adapted to the specific nature of the French administrative and political system.
The IO was set up to design, construct and operate the reactor. Its financing,
organisation and staffing procedures are specified by the ITER Agreement be-
tween the Member Parties. The Agreement also establishes types and amounts
of equipment to be contributed and types of work to be carried out by each
Member Party. The seven members of the project have all created legal enti-
ties called Domestic Agencies. The Russia-based entity is named Russian ITER
National Agency.
In compliance with requirement 1.1, the IO has established an ‘ITER Quality
Assurance Program’ to meet the requirements of the French Quality Order. The
programme specifies the ITER design activities, the entitlements and responsi-
bilities of responsible officers, and a list of suppliers and contractors.
Another document, ‘Safety Important Functions and Components Classifi-
cation Criteria and Methodology,’ developed in pursuance of requirement 1.2,
establishes four safety importance classes (SICs) for the reactor components
and systems.
SIC 1 includes structures, systems and components that perform key safety
functions.
Items belonging to SIC 2 are structures, systems and components used to
prevent, detect or mitigate accidents or incidents.
SIC 3 is for safety-related items (SRs) whose failure would not have a
safety impact, but may, in some circumstances, affect the performance of their
important safety functions.
Reactor structures, systems and components whose failure has no safety-
related impact fall within SIC 4.
IO’s ‘Quality Classification Determination’ document establishes the princi-
ples for classifying reactor structures, systems and components by the following
quality criteria, in addition to the SICs:

l anticipated impact of an item failure/malfunction on the machine,
l availability, and
l cost of repair and/or expected downtime.
The first quality class includes the following reactor structures, systems and
components:

l SIC-1 items
l items belonging to other SICs, if their failure/malfunction makes the
machine inoperative for more than 3 weeks.