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368 Martin Reisigl

“compound discrimination” relies on several grounds of discrimination which
add to each other in a particular situation: “An illustrious example would be, to
continue along the intersection of origin and gender, a situation in which the
labor market is segregated on multiple basis: some jobs are considered suitable
only for men, and only some jobs are reserved particularly for immigrants. In
such a situation, the prospects of an immigrant woman to find a job matching
her merits are markedly reduced because of compound discrimination.” (Mak-
konen 2002: 11).
The recognition of complex discriminatory phenomena such as multiple, in-
tersectional and compound discrimination should prevent analysts of intercultural
communication from explaining discrimination simplistically by taking “culture”
or “subculture” as an essentialized and homogenous category. Only a multi-fac-
torial analysis becomes aware of the many different facets of discrimination.
(3) The third conceptual component is the discriminating action or process
itself, by which justice or human rights are infringed. It is realized in various
social sectors or fields (such as legislation, work, education, housing, public ser-
vices, mass media, sports) and can take the form of a (physical) action or non-
action, of an active exclusion and segregation, a denial of opportunities and
equal rights, different treatment, an act of ignoring, an omission, etc. It may be
realized verbally or in writing (e.g. by a degrading insult, a derision or a ban-
ning) or visually (e.g. by a humiliating depiction). It can be direct or indirect,
explicit or implicit, etc.
(4) The concept of discrimination always includes a “distinguishing fea-
ture” or peg on which to hang the discrimination. The distinguishing features
that are taken for the dissimilation and separation are frequently related to social
identity markers, for instance to gender, “race”, skin colour, birth, hereditary
factors, age, disability, the ethnic, national or social background, the member-
ship of a (for example national) minority, language, religion or belief, ideology,
political affiliation, sexual orientation and economic situation. The distinguish-
ing criteria on the basis of which people are treated differently, negatively and
adversely are often interpreted as stigmata that are considered to indicate a
negative deviancy from a positive “normality” (see Goffman 1963).
Unfortunately, the reasons for discrimination are very often identified by ex-
clusive reference to these real or fictitious features, and this is rather misleading,
since it is not “race” which is the reason for the discrimination against a specific
group of persons, but racism, which lies behind the social construction of “race”
categories (see Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 2–5). In most legal texts, be it on a
national or an international level, one reads about “discrimination on the
grounds of ‘race’, gender, age, etc.” Such “grounds” are often conflated with
“reasons”, the phrase “on the grounds of” being interpreted as “for the reasons
that.” At this point, linguistic critique should ask for a more accurate language
use that does not risk a fallacious inversion, that is to say, the identification of