Page 218 - Information and American Democracy Technology in the Evolution of Political Power

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Theoretical Considerations
engaged with politics. The centerpiece of this approach is the Downsian
modelofpoliticalrationality.Asaclassicofpoliticalscience, AnEconomic
Theory of Democracy is indeed as much a theory of political information
as it is a theory of political behavior. In Anthony Downs’s work, and
in most of the work in the rational tradition, information is central to
behavior because uncertainty is central. If one assumes as Downs does
that uncertainty is a basic force in human affairs, then the acquisition
and use of information to reduce uncertainty is an elemental feature of
all human activity as well. 10 In the classical formulation, “coping with
uncertainty is a major function of nearly every significant institution in
society” 11 as well as a major activity of the political individual. At the
same time, “most uncertainty is removable through the acquisition of
information.” 12
Another feature of the rational model is the observation that infor-
mation is costly. In the Downsian view, information costs are of two
types: those associated with the acquisition of information – namely,
the time, effort, and material resources needed to learn information rel-
evant to a political goal – and those associated with its evaluation in
the mind of the individual. The role of information in political activity
is therefore subject to a law of diminishing marginal returns. In the-
ory, “the information-seeker continues to invest resources in procuring
data until the marginal return from information equals its marginal
cost.” 13 In practice, though, the situation is made slightly more com-
plex by the fact that citizens’ strength of preference varies. A citizen
who is highly committed to a particular candidate or issue has little
incentive to acquire information, since it is unlikely that any new in-
formation would alter his or her preferences. At the same time, Downs
argues, a citizen who is uncertain and indifferent and who therefore
could learn the most from a marginal increase in information may
nonetheless be held back from obtaining it by ex ante indifference over
outcomes.
Interestingly enough, a good deal of political science outside the
rational choice tradition also approaches the relationship between infor-
mation and participation in ways that are generally consistent with the
rationalapproach,ifnotsoexplicitandwelldeveloped.Theclaimthatthe
cost of political information could directly affect levels of participation

10
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1957).
11 12 13
Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 77. Ibid., p. 215.
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