Page 220 - Information and American Democracy Technology in the Evolution of Political Power

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Theoretical Considerations
given the objectives of the individual. 17 This “system” of information
acquisition is carefully tailored to select the information most likely to
reduce uncertainty for each individual.
Among the many sources of information available to citizens are pro-
fessional experts, interest groups, parties, mass media, government, and
other individuals. Individuals therefore may delegate some of the task
of acquiring and organizing information to others who are likely to use
the same selection criteria that they would themselves. Downs argues
that this means that obtaining one’s political information from a knowl-
edgeable and politically compatible neighbor may be rationally superior
to systematically reading the newspaper until one feels adequately in-
formed. This also means that a polity in which each individual is equally
well informed is irrational, since it is frequently more efficient to dele-
gate to others the task of becoming informed about any particular choice,
provided the right information agents can be located.
In light of this general approach and especially the problem of a priori
attention, we can turn to questions of the contemporary information
revolution. What should be the consequences from the instrumental
perspective of information abundance? In the Downsian formulation,
the answer depends on the extent to which individuals can improve
upon their personalized information-acquisition systems. If technolog-
ical changes that reduce the objective cost of information also permit
individuals to find information providers whose selection criteria are
congruent with their own, then Downsian theory predicts that individu-
als will realize gains from the technological changes. If they are unable to
locate compatible providers of information and must yield control over
the way that information is selected and constructed by others, even if
that information is essentially free, then this compromise may offset any
gains from reduced objective costs of information. The realized cost of
information to an individual is therefore a function of both its objective
cost and its political loading – the ways that it is selected and the individ-
ual’s perception of the congruence of that selection with his or her own
approach to acquiring information.
The selection problem inherent in solving the dilemma of a priori
attention creates what Downs calls a “major drawback” of mass media as
a source of political information requisite to action. 18 Traditional mass
media–Downsisthinkingherechieflyofradioandnewspapers–provide
political information whose marginal costs to citizens are virtually zero,

17 18
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 219. Ibid., p. 230.
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