Page 60 - Information and American Democracy Technology in the Evolution of Political Power

P1: IPI/IBE/IRR/GYQ
0 521 80067 6
CY101-Bimber
August 13, 2002
10:39
CY101-02
The Information Theory of The Federalist
interests. This weakens the tendency for factiousness in the national
legislature.
More important, informational dynamics help solve the filter prob-
lem, and Publius is more explicit about this effect. He assumes that pol-
icy making in the context of multiple, contending interests has different
requirements than policy making among small, homogenous groups, in-
cluding the exchange of extensive political information and the intensive
vetting of ideas. Publius realizes that before a majority can be formed in
a large, heterogeneous democracy, a thorough process of political com-
munication must take place in which contending ideas are voiced, and
arguments and counterarguments are forwarded. On the other hand,
smaller, homogeneous states can more easily assemble poorly informed,
nondeliberative majorities that tend to factiousness. The deliberations of
thedissimilarpartiestoapotentialmajorityinaheterogeneoussystemre-
veal political information about interests and intentions. In other words,
assembling majorities among diverse interests is possible, but commits
politicians to the disclosure and exchange of information.
The question then becomes, Why is the justness of democratic out-
comes related to the extent of information associated with them? The
answer lies in Publius’s faith in the latent reason of political elites. He
believes that humans possess simultaneously the capacity for both good
and bad actions, and the design of governments should serve to facilitate
the good. The passions, that great threat to justice, he believes, thrive in
information-poor environments. They are more likely to be subdued by
reason and better judgment where information is rich. In 64, Madison
notes that it is the “secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority”
(emphasis added) against which precautions are needed. Factious ma-
jorities differ from nonfactious majorities in that the former are rooted
in seduction of the public, secrecy, appeals to the passions, and dema-
goguery. Their politics depends on an environment where information
is circumscribed and where alternatives, rival possibilities, and the other
ingredients of deliberation are absent.
This connection between information and deliberation appears
throughout The Federalist. For instance, Hamilton writes in 68 that the
electoral college will succeed because electors are likely to “possess the in-
formation and discernment” requisite to choosing the national leader. 24
In defense of the qualifications for the Senate in 62, Madison observes
the need for “greater extent of information and stability of character” on

24
The Federalist, p. 458.
43