Page 61 - Information and American Democracy Technology in the Evolution of Political Power

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Information Revolutions
the part of senators. Information and good judgment again go hand in
hand. In 35, Madison writes: “If we take into the account the momentary
humorsordispositionswhichmayhappentoprevailinparticularpartsof
the society, and to which a wise administration will never be inattentive,
is the man whose situation leads to extensive inquiry and information
less likely to be a competent judge of their nature, extent, and foun-
dation than one whose observation does not travel beyond the circle
of his neighbors and acquaintances?” 25 A national government, writes
Hamilton in 27, would be “better administered” than the state gov-
ernments, in part because the circumstances of the national govern-
ment “promise greater knowledge and more extensive information in
the national councils.” In 58, Madison continues that the “eloquence and
address of a few”– demagoguery – is most likely to act on people “of
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limited information and of weak capacities.” In 64, Jay nicely summa-
rizes the premise of his partners: “[D]iscretion and discernment” are to
be found in government in proportion to “the means of extensive and
accurate information.” 27
Publius recognizes that human reason and judgment are fallible even
in the presence of adequate information, and thus he also understands
that the public as well as elites may be possessed of a mixture of mo-
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tives that are not always just. So while he rejects the idea that democ-
racy depends on the good will of public actors, he nonetheless believes
that given adequate information as an antidote to demagoguery, enough
people will be inclined toward justice and reason for democracy to suc-
ceed. 29 In this argument, Publius resolves the filter problem. The ex-
tended republic does not obstruct all majorities indiscriminately, but
biases politics toward the disclosure of greater amounts of information
than do smaller, simpler democracies. That informational tendency ex-
erts a filtering effect, since prudence and good judgment are facilitated by
information.
One need not accept the formal view of Benjamin Page and Robert
Shapiro, who have argued the entire problem of the passions is one of
“incomplete information,” to be persuaded by Publius that information
matters in the success of democracy, and that institutional arrangements
matter in the state of information. On this point, the authors of The

25 26 27
Ibid., p. 221. Ibid., p. 396. Ibid., p. 433.
28
Edward J. Millican, One United People: The Federalist Papers and the National Idea
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1990).
29
David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of “The Federalist” (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1984).
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