Page 82 - Innovations in Intelligent Machines
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Team, Game, and Negotiation based UAV Task Allocation  71
                           on the horizontal axis. These plots reveal important information about the
                           computational effort that each strategy demands.
                              Finally, we carried out another simulation to demonstrate the utility of
                           the Nash strategies when the perceived uncertainty maps of the agents are
                           different from the actual uncertainty map. For this it was assumed that the
                           uncertainty reduction factors (β) of the agents fluctuate with time due to
                           fluctuation in the performance of their sensor suites due to environmental
                           or other reasons. Each agent knows its own current uncertainty reduction
                           factor perfectly but assumes that the uncertainty reduction factors of the
                           other agents to be the same as their initial value. This produces disparity
                           in the uncertainty map between agents and from the actual uncertainty map
                           which evolves according to the true β values as the search progresses. The
                           variation in the value of β for the five agents are shown in Figure 11.
                              In this situation the total uncertainty reduction is as shown in Figure 12,
                           which shows that both the Nash strategies, which do not make any assumption


                                   4   q = 1
                                  x 10
                                                                 x 10 4  q = 2
                                5                              5
                                4.8  greedy Nash Coalitional Nash  4.9  greedy
                               Number of decision epochs  4.2 4  security  Number of decision epochs  4.7  Cooperative
                                       cooperative
                                4.6
                                                               4.8
                                4.4
                                                               4.6
                                3.8
                                3.6
                                                               4.5
                                                                           security
                                3.4
                                3.2
                                                               4.3
                                3                              4.4     Nash & Coalitional Nash
                                2.8                            4.2
                                 10 -3  10 -2  10 -1  10 0  10 1  10 2  10 -3  10 -2  10 -1  10 0  10 1  10 2
                                          Time in seconds                Time in seconds
                           Fig. 10. Computational time of various strategies for q = 2 for random initial
                           uncertainty maps
                                                     Variation of β with time steps
                                            1
                                                β 1
                                           0.9
                                           0.8
                                               β 2
                                           0.7
                                          β    β 3
                                           0.6
                                           0.5
                                               β 4
                                           0.4
                                                  β 5
                                             0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180  200
                                                         Number of steps
                                      Fig. 11. Variation in the uncertainty reduction factors
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