Page 186 - Leadership Lessons of the White House Fellows
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LEADERS ARE PERSUASIVE

             Union led the mainland Chinese to feel diplomatically strained and iso-
             lated. President Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and
             other top-ranking U.S. officials were convinced that improved relations
             with the PRC would tip the balance of power toward the United States
             in its Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union. Opening up trade with
             the PRC would be a windfall for American commerce too. However, the
             White House was worried: Would President Nixon be able to convince
             the American people that the time was right for détente between the
             United States and China? Was the nation ready to see its president
             embracing “the enemy”?
                 “Here was China, a country that was killing millions of their own peo-
             ple in the middle of their cultural revolution,” McFarlane said. “Here was a
             country that was providing arms to Vietnam, that was killing Americans,
             and here was a communist government. I mean, if the president had just
             announced that he was going to China to open talks with that government
             and that was that, people would have said, ‘What in the dickens are we
             doing, Nixon?’ But he first employed strategies to engage his three key
             constituencies—Congress, our allies, and the American people—and those
             are the constituencies a president has to tend to if he’s going to get his ideas
             adopted, shared, supported, funded, and ultimately made successful. So it
             was only through privately, clandestinely nurturing the idea and, impor-
             tantly, publicly outlining all the strategic advantages it would give us against
             the Soviet Union that he achieved such a dramatic, historic leap forward.”
                 In July 1971, President Nixon secretly sent Kissinger to China to meet
             with Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai to make all the arrangements
             for Nixon’s upcoming visit. Kissinger was supposed to be in Pakistan that
             day, but he pretended to be sick and gave the press the slip. Less than a
             week later, President Nixon announced that he had been invited to the
             PRC and would be meeting with Chairman Mao. A majority of Americans
             supported the trip, and in February 1972, McFarlane watched along with
             the rest of the world as President Nixon and Chairman Mao greeted
             each other with a warm—and historic—handshake. Nixon’s approval rating
             soared.
                 Although McFarlane’s Fellowship year ended in August 1972, his time
             in Washington did not. Henry Kissinger asked McFarlane to stay on and
             be his military assistant. In that role he engaged in sensitive intelligence
             interactions with Chinese officials and accompanied Dr. Kissinger on trips

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