Page 187 - Leadership Lessons of the White House Fellows
P. 187

THE LESSONS

             to China. McFarlane was involved in every facet of U.S. policy in the
             Middle East and the Soviet Union, including arms control issues. When
             Vice President Gerald Ford assumed the presidency after Richard Nixon’s
             resignation, he appointed McFarlane to be his special assistant for national
             security affairs. McFarlane served in that capacity until 1976, when he
             returned to the Marine Corps. After accepting a series of additional con-
             gressional and presidential appointments, McFarlane became President
             Ronald Reagan’s national security advisor, a position in which he helped
             design and carry out a course of action that led to the end of the Cold War
             and the reduction of nuclear weapons.
                 Throughout the Cold War, the Americans and Soviets had engaged in
             a dangerous game of one-upmanship when it came to accumulating nuclear
             weapons. The doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) had deterred
             the launch of any catastrophic weapons from either side, but President
             Reagan did not think the offensive strategy of hoarding more arms was
             sustainable. He wanted to explore a different policy, a switch to a defensive
             mode. “Reagan didn’t believe in deterrence through massive offensive
             power, but his Defense Department didn’t agree with him for the first
             couple years of his presidency,” McFarlane recalled. “Indeed, they never
             enthusiastically went along with the idea of shifting from offense to
             defense, but Reagan said that he didn’t think it was moral to base our
             stability in the world on the ability to destroy everybody, because the chaos
             theory tells you that at some point an accident is going to happen as you
             keep building more and more and more. From my point of view and
             Reagan’s, we were militarily in an unsustainable position. So what were we
             going to do? Well, if we couldn’t build up our own side and deploy them,
             and we couldn’t get the Russians to unilaterally reduce, our only choice was
             really to go to defense.”
                 McFarlane’s opinion was based in part on something he discovered dur-
             ing his Fellowship year: The Russians had enormous respect for and fear
             of American technology. McFarlane had long been a student of military
             strategy, and he often thought about the role economics plays in defense.
             He came to the conclusion that if the United States was to develop a way
             to deter a ballistic missile launch, the Soviets would be both financially and
             scientifically unable to match it.
                 McFarlane queried the country’s leading scientists engaged in national
             security research and development, including Edward Teller, the creator of

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