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LITERACY AND MULTIMODALITY 55

            ordering  with  its  meanings  has  to  be  chosen;  students  chose  different
            arrangements for their concept maps; as in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, for instance.
              In  the  map  in  Figure  4.5,  directionality  is  indicated  in  the  left-to-right
            arrangement  of  the  ‘concepts’,  suggesting  movement  from  left  to  right,  by
            analogy  with  the  reading  direction  of  Western  alphabetic  writing.  There  are
            negative consequences of expressing meaning through spatial relations. Not only
            is  it  the  case  that  one  specific  organisation  has  to  be  chosen  –  centrality  and
            marginality; or central and concentric; or left as origin and movement to the right
            as destination – but also every instance of a particular relation means the same.
            The meaning necessarily dictated by choosing one element as central – as blood
            is  in  Figure  4.4  –  means  that  other  elements  cannot  be.  But  that  might  not  be
            what the maker of the concept map intended. He might not have wished to make
            a  choice;  something  of  that  is  indicated  in  Figure  4.5,  where  there  are  two
            starting points, the heart and the lungs.
              The  problem  of  the  single  meaning  of  the  relation  has  obviously  struck  the
            makers  of  these  maps,  who  feel  the  need  to  supplement  the  arrows  and  lines
            with written labels of various kinds, indicating that in fact the different lines and
            arrows  mean  different  things.  Of  course  this  may  be  an  effect  of  the  maker’s
            relative incompetence in constructing such maps, or the relative unsuitability of
            the genre for this task – something that is not uncommon in demands made by
            teachers – but it does show a limitation of this mode in this genre.


                           Mode and epistemological commitment
            Each mode demands what I shall call epistemological commitments. If I say ‘a
            plant cell has a nucleus’, I have been forced by the mode to provide a name for
            the  relation  between  the  cell  and  the  nucleus.  I  have  named  it  as  a  relation  of
            possession, ‘have’. If I draw the cell, and have been asked to indicate the nucleus,
            my  drawing  requires  me  to  place  the  element  that  indicates  the  nucleus
            somewhere; I cannot avoid that epistemological commitment. Whether I actually
            think that it is just there, or whether I wanted to indicate a special place, I cannot
            avoid placing it somewhere. A viewer of my drawing is entitled to assume that
            ‘there’ is where it is supposed to be. My drawing, however, does not require me
            to  say  anything  about  possession,  just  as  the  writing  did  not  require  me  to  say
            where in the cell the nucleus is located.


                                    Mode and causality
            Causality may be one of the most significant of such accidents. If, in the diary, we
            read ‘I … squeezed my way through’, we know that the agent that did the squeezing
            is the agent who caused this action. Causation is just about built into clauses in
            languages such as English, with their noun-subject–verb–object structures, where
            noun-subject  carries  more  or  less  implicitly  the  meaning  of  agentive  cause.
            Sequence  of  events  as  represented  in  sequences  of  clauses  is  often  open  to  a
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