Page 31 - Living Room Wars Rethinking Media Audiences for a Postmodern World
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        you will be one of us!’—an appeal which is part and parcel of a more populist ideology,
        in which values of communality, emotional involvement and humour predominate.
           It seems, then, that different types of involvement, based upon different ideological
        positions, can be constructed by televisual discourse. It does not make sense, therefore, to
        see  televisual  discourse as a basically  unified text without essential internal
        contradictions, despite its apparent diversity. An analysis of televisual discourse as  a
        whole  might  prove to be more fruitful if we look for the real tensions in it, for the
        contradictions in the appeals it  attempts  to create for the viewers. In other words, we
        should analyse the  different  positions offered to viewers  in relation to televisual
        discourse, and the ways in which these positions are inscribed within different parts or
        levels of TV programming. From here, we can then go on to ask how viewers relate to
        those positions. Or to put it in a slightly different way: how do socially defined audience
        preferences correspond to the variety of televisual address?
           It is an empirical fact, for instance, that different sections of the social audience relate
        differently to specific programme categories. To avoid a wholly sociological explanation
        of this we should attempt to relate the alternation of acceptance and rejection of what TV
        offers its viewers to the heterogeneous structure of televisual discourse itself, and to the
        fact that the types of involvement suggested by televisual discourse don’t all have the
        same rhetorical power. In this way, the socio-cultural effectivity of television, which is
        merely stated in Ellis’s work, can be returned to the analysis, for it is the connection of
        rhetorical  strategies  (or the failure to achieve such a connection) to the audience’s
        perspective of viewing which is at issue here.


                      THE POLITICS OF ‘TROSSIFIED’ TELEVISION

        To make this theoretical argument  rather less abstract, I shall now provide an
        interpretation of the history of Dutch television.  More precisely, I would like to say
        something about one particular moment in this history, which has come to be known as
        the moment of ‘trossification’ (‘vertrossing’). This neologism stands for the increase of
        commercialized programming within Dutch  broadcast television from the early 1970s
        onwards—a development which has led to a lot of worried debates among  media
        specialists, journalists, politicians and other intellectuals. I would like to take issue with
        their gloomy reflections here and will try to show that ‘trossified television’ can be seen
        as a consequence of the failure of Dutch broadcasting politics to take into account the
        audience’s perspective of viewing and to  make  the viewers feel involved with its
        programming policies. First, however, it  is necessary briefly to outline the Dutch
        broadcasting system.
           It  is  relevant  here to note that heterogeneity of televisual discourse is a legal
        requirement laid down in the 1967 Broadcasting Act. This Act contains a clause which
        decrees that every broadcasting organization entitled to transmission time should present
        a ‘comprehensive’ programme schedule, consisting of ‘cultural, informative, educative
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        and entertainment’ programmes.  Although this formalized heterogeneity does  not
        necessarily coincide with a heterogeneity of modes of address, as the formal categories
        refer primarily to a prescribed heterogeneity of social functions of televisual discourse, it
        should be clear that,  ideologically  speaking, this formal distinction of programme
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