Page 33 - Living Room Wars Rethinking Media Audiences for a Postmodern World
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Living room wars       24
        ideologically  defined, pre-existent cultural or religious identities among the Dutch
        people/nation, reflecting the myth of Dutch tolerance and of the Netherlands as a country
        of ‘unity in diversity’. It is assumed that the programming policies of each organization
        should comprehensively reflect both its founding ideology and the needs and concerns of
        the ‘pillar’ it represents, although it is clear that there cannot be a direct translation of an
        overarching ideology or world view  into  all concrete programmes (e.g. how do you
        produce a Roman Catholic quiz show or sitcom?).
           Nevertheless, for a long  time  Dutch  television was generally assumed to be a fair
        reflection of the plurality of existing ideologies  structuring  national life. The Dutch
        broadcasting system has been celebrated for its perfect incorporation of  principles  of
        democracy and freedom, as well as cultural pluralism. It has been regarded as a superior
        model within which television can be used as a medium which justly caters for people’s
        needs as citizens of a pluralist society. Implicitly inscribed in the system is a definition of
        television viewing as a very respectable practice: your television-viewing activity should
        be in accordance with your pre-existent ideological world view. In other words, the ideal
        viewer is not only a ‘comprehensive’ viewer, but also an ideologically motivated one. For
        instance, if you are a socialist, you are supposed to be a member of VARA and your
        favourite programmes must be VARA’s programmes. Thus, your television viewing is
        determined by the fact that you are part of the ‘Red Family’.
           Basically,  however, the system represents a  paternalistic relationship between
        television and its audiences: audience preferences only become explicit and legitimized
        in so far as they fit into the imputed needs, values and concerns of the respective ‘pillars’.
        It is a system in which the elites governing the broadcasting organizations claim to know
        what  is good for the people and what they like to see, because they are assumed to
        represent and speak for their audiences: it is assumed that production and consumption
        stem from the same ideological community.  In this system, the ‘serious’ and the
        ‘popular’ are not conceived of as opposite to  each other, but as parts  of  an  organic,
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        communal whole, with the ‘serious’ occupying the position of a vanguard.
           This represents only the ideal functioning  of  the system, however. It does not say
        anything about how audiences actually watch television. The lack of fit between ideal and
        reality became apparent in the late  1960s  with the foundation of a new broadcasting
        organization, TROS. The philosophy  on  which TROS’s programming is based is
        essentially populist and devoid of any explicit ideology: its aim is ‘to give people the
        programmes they want to  see’.  TROS  doesn’t claim to represent any ideologically
        defined ‘pillar’, but the people in general. The success of this  strategy  was
        overwhelming: according to an inquiry held in 1975, 36 per cent of the Dutch population
        preferred TROS above all other broadcasting organizations (followed by AVRO with 13
        per cent and VARA with 10 per cent), whereas 47 per cent held that TROS’s programmes
        (mainly  entertainment, American series and very light information) were the best
        (Jungman 1975). As a consequence, panic resulted. Except for VPRO, which developed a
        non-conformist, artistic style of programming to construct its distinctive identity (which
        had little to do with its  original  religious background), the traditional broadcasting
        organizations felt obliged to react to TROS’s success by copying its programming policy
        and modes of address. For example, during the 1960s current affairs programmes were
        the flagship of the broadcasting organizations and were scheduled at prime time. In the
        face of the new competition, however, these ‘serious’ programmes adopted more popular
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