Page 33 - Living Room Wars Rethinking Media Audiences for a Postmodern World
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Living room wars 24
ideologically defined, pre-existent cultural or religious identities among the Dutch
people/nation, reflecting the myth of Dutch tolerance and of the Netherlands as a country
of ‘unity in diversity’. It is assumed that the programming policies of each organization
should comprehensively reflect both its founding ideology and the needs and concerns of
the ‘pillar’ it represents, although it is clear that there cannot be a direct translation of an
overarching ideology or world view into all concrete programmes (e.g. how do you
produce a Roman Catholic quiz show or sitcom?).
Nevertheless, for a long time Dutch television was generally assumed to be a fair
reflection of the plurality of existing ideologies structuring national life. The Dutch
broadcasting system has been celebrated for its perfect incorporation of principles of
democracy and freedom, as well as cultural pluralism. It has been regarded as a superior
model within which television can be used as a medium which justly caters for people’s
needs as citizens of a pluralist society. Implicitly inscribed in the system is a definition of
television viewing as a very respectable practice: your television-viewing activity should
be in accordance with your pre-existent ideological world view. In other words, the ideal
viewer is not only a ‘comprehensive’ viewer, but also an ideologically motivated one. For
instance, if you are a socialist, you are supposed to be a member of VARA and your
favourite programmes must be VARA’s programmes. Thus, your television viewing is
determined by the fact that you are part of the ‘Red Family’.
Basically, however, the system represents a paternalistic relationship between
television and its audiences: audience preferences only become explicit and legitimized
in so far as they fit into the imputed needs, values and concerns of the respective ‘pillars’.
It is a system in which the elites governing the broadcasting organizations claim to know
what is good for the people and what they like to see, because they are assumed to
represent and speak for their audiences: it is assumed that production and consumption
stem from the same ideological community. In this system, the ‘serious’ and the
‘popular’ are not conceived of as opposite to each other, but as parts of an organic,
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communal whole, with the ‘serious’ occupying the position of a vanguard.
This represents only the ideal functioning of the system, however. It does not say
anything about how audiences actually watch television. The lack of fit between ideal and
reality became apparent in the late 1960s with the foundation of a new broadcasting
organization, TROS. The philosophy on which TROS’s programming is based is
essentially populist and devoid of any explicit ideology: its aim is ‘to give people the
programmes they want to see’. TROS doesn’t claim to represent any ideologically
defined ‘pillar’, but the people in general. The success of this strategy was
overwhelming: according to an inquiry held in 1975, 36 per cent of the Dutch population
preferred TROS above all other broadcasting organizations (followed by AVRO with 13
per cent and VARA with 10 per cent), whereas 47 per cent held that TROS’s programmes
(mainly entertainment, American series and very light information) were the best
(Jungman 1975). As a consequence, panic resulted. Except for VPRO, which developed a
non-conformist, artistic style of programming to construct its distinctive identity (which
had little to do with its original religious background), the traditional broadcasting
organizations felt obliged to react to TROS’s success by copying its programming policy
and modes of address. For example, during the 1960s current affairs programmes were
the flagship of the broadcasting organizations and were scheduled at prime time. In the
face of the new competition, however, these ‘serious’ programmes adopted more popular