Page 621 - Marine Structural Design
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     Chapter 34 Risk Centered Maintenance                                  591
                       System:                                  Performed by:
                       Ref. Drawing no:                         Date:
                                            Failure Effects
                                                     Y
                             Figure 34.4  Example of an RMECA Form
                 A variety of FMECA forms are used in the RCM analysis. An example of the FMECA forms
                 is shown in Figure 34.2. The various columns in the form are discussed below:
                 MSI: the item number (tag number).
                 OperationaI mode: for example running or standby.
                 Function: e.g. a function of standby water supply pump is used to start pump upon demand.
                 Failure mode: the manner by which a failure is observed and is defined as non-hlfillment of
                 one of the equipment functions.
                 Failure severity: described in terms of the  “worst case” impacts on safety, environmental
                 protection, production  loss/delay and  other  economic costs. The  severity classes may be
                 defined using an approach that is similar to the consequence categories for qualitative risk
                 analysis.
                 Failure likelihood: defined as the “worst case” probability of failure. In this stage, qualitative
                 classes are appropriate. The relevant likelihood classes can be defined using a procedure that is
                 similar to the probability categories for qualitative risk analysis.
                 CriticaIity: can be  derived by combining the  relevant failure severity and likelihood. The
                 procedure  is  similar  to  determining risk  levels  of  systems,  sub-systems, and  equipment.
                 However, the difference is that criticality considers failure modes.
                 The information described so  far  should be  considered for all failure modes. A  screening
                 process is now appropriate, giving only critical failure modes.
                 For the critical failure modes the following fields are required:
                 Failure came: For each failure mode there may be more than one failure cause. Note that a11
                 components should be considered at this step. A “fail to close” failure of a safety valve may
                 for example be caused by a broken spring in the actuator.
                 Failure mechanism: Examples of failure mechanisms are fatigue, corrosion, and wear.





