Page 106 - Contribution To Phenomenology
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THE BODY AS    PAN-CULTURAL      UNIVERSAL           99

              experiences  I  hope  show,  animate  form  is  aheady  meaningful.  Our  own
              eyes  are  meaningful  in  and  of  themselves.  They  are  archetypally
              meaningful  as  windows  onto  two  worlds,  as  centers  of  Ught  and  dark,  as
              entrances  to  a  tactile-kinesthetic  world,  our  own  and  that  of  others.  They
              are  archetypally  meaningful  as  circles,  as  I will  presently  show  in a  more
              developed  manner.  These  meanings  can  be  and  are  reworked—amplified
              or  suppressed—in  diverse  metaphysical  and  epistemological  ways  from
              culture  to  culture.  Rather  than  directly  setting  forth  these  ways,  I  will
              attempt  to  demonstrate  archetypal  meanings  of  eyes  in  the  context  of
              actual  disciplinary  practices,  including  the  disciplinary  practice  of
              philosphy.  I  will  do  this  by  pursuing  the  notion  of  animate  form—first
              with  reference  to  its  general  semantic  import,  and  then  with  specific
              reference  to  its  morphologicaWisual  import.

                                             IV

              Paleoanthropology  (not  to  mention  other  disciplines  closer  to  home—if
              not  home  itself)  misses  the  semantic  dimension  of  animate  form  because
              it  fails  to  recognize  the  corporeaUty  and  intercorporeality  of  life  as
              something  other  than  mere  anatomy on  the  one  hand  and  mere  behavior
              on  the  other,  and  fails  as  well  to  take  seriously  the  actual  ways  in  which
             anatomy  is  destiny.^^ Not  dissimilar  oversights  are  apparent  in experimen-
              tal  primatological  studies  and  in  studies  in  the  philosophy  of  mind.  The
             consistent  problem  is  first,  that  bodies—animate  forms—are  not
             acknowledged  and  understood  and  second,  that  descriptive  analyses  of
             what  is  actually  there  are  passed  over  in  favor  of  explanatory  hypotheses
             of  what  is  there.  With  respect  to  the  latter  problem—and  to  gloss  on  a
             comment  of  Joseph  Campbell—"If  you  haven't  had  the  experience,  how
             can  you  explain  what  is  going  on?'*^®  With  respect  to  the  first  problem,




                ^^ Freud  is  reputedly  the  source  of  this  notion.  It  is  ironic  then  that,  credited
             with  such  a  rich  insight,  he  actually  left  the  body  behind  and  unattended:  he
             developed  the  idea  that  anatomy  is  destiny  only  in  terms  of  a  single  bodily  organ.
              Indeed,  he  never  mined  his  initial  insight  that,  in  his  own  words,  "The  ego  is  first
             and  foremost  a  bodily  ego."  (Standard  Edition  XIX,  translated  by  James  Strachey
              [London:  Hogarth  Press,  1955],  26.  The  phrase  is  repeated  on  p.  27.)  The
              ontogenetical  corporeal  psychoanalytic  ego  is  phenomenologically  related  to  the
              phylogenetic  heritage  of  the  body  as  semantic  template.
                i«  Joseph  Campbell,  The Power  of  Myth  (New  York:  Doubleday,  1988),  61:  "If
             you  haven't  had  the  experience,  how  can  you  know  what  it  is?"
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