Page 122 - Contribution To Phenomenology
P. 122

Chapter   4

                     Connectionism         and    Phenomenology


                                        Tom   Nenon
                                Memphis    State  University

                     Abstract  After  a  brief introduction  to  Connectionism  and  some
                     general remarks on the relationship between Phenomenology and the
                     empirical sciences,  this paper presents examples of the way that both
                     Phenomenology and Connectionism can benefit from insights derived
                     from  the  other  approach.

              There  is  of  course  no  discrete  object  clearly  denoted  either  by  the  term
              "Phenomenology" or  by  the  term  "Connectionism."  Each  of  these  terms
              can be  better  thought of  as  referring  to a  theoretical  movement  centering
              around  specific  themes,  approaches,  and  figures.  For  not  only  does  each
              of  these  movements  as  such  lack  clearly  delineated  contours, but  each  is
              also  characterized  by  a  fair  amount  of  disagreement  among  friends  and
              foes  alike  over  what  should  be  taken  to  be  its  essential  constituting
              features.  This  is  probably  even  more  true  for  Connectionism  than  for
              Phenomenology,  partially  because  it  is  a  fairly  recent  newcomer  to  the
              intellectual  scene,  but  also  because  it  has  emerged  from  an  inter-
              disciplinary  background  which  unites  researchers  with  very  different
              agenda.  Interestingly  enough,  however,  this  should  be  less  of  a  source
              of  embarrassment  for  someone  who  thinks  of  herself  as  a  connectionist
              than  for  many  who  consider  themselves  "phenomenologists" according  to
              some  of  the  classic  formulations  of  the  project  since  one  result  of
              reflection  about  connectionist  theories  is  that  it  leads  one  to  think  of
              concepts  more  as  general  types  than  as  sets  of  necessary  and  sufficient
              conditions  for  being  a  certain  kind  of  thing.  I  will  return  to  that  theme
              at  the  end  of  Part  I.
                First,  however,  I  would  like  to  begin  by  stating  that  when  I  use  the
              term  "Phenomenology" in  this  essay,  I  will  be  referring  in  a  general  way
              to  an  approach  oriented  upon  the  work  of  Edmund  Husserl,  without



                                             115
              M. Daniel and L. Embree (eds.), Phenomenology of the Cultural Disciplines,  115-133.
              ©  1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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