Page 124 - Contribution To Phenomenology
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CONNECTIONISMAND PHENOMENOLOGY                      117

              according  to  programmable  rules  in  order  to  process  data  and  store
              information,  and  then  on  the  basis  of  these  rules  and  stored  information
              to  process  other  data  and  perform  specific  tasks  for  which  the  machines
              have  been  programmed  in  the  first  place.^  It  follows  from  this  model  of
              the  mind  as  a  computer,  the  "classical"  model  of  a  computer,  that
              cognition  is  nothing  other  than  "rule-governed  symbol  manipulation."'
                This  characterization  points  to  two  things:  a)  the  formal  character  of
              the  operations,  the  fact  that  these  programs  function  analogously  to
              mathematical  calculus  or  propositional  logic,  i.e.,  apply  to  a  wide  range
              of  possible  subject  matter  precisely  because  the  performance  of  the
              operation  is  indifferent  to  the  particular  data  to  be  processed;  and b)  the
              susceptibility  of  these  manipulated  entities,  be  they  thought  of  as  data,
              information  strings,  or  the  physical  states  of  the  machine,  to  being
              interpreted  in  terms  of  something  else  that  they  represent,  i.e.,  as
              representations  of  beliefs  and  desires  or  things  in  the  real  world—a  point
              which  is  especially  relevant  when  applying  the  computer  model  to  the
              mental  life  of  humans  and  asking  what  it  means  for  beliefs  and  desires
              to  "represent"  the  world. I  will  say  a  little  more  about  this  in  the  fourth
              part  of  my  paper.
                When  applied  to  the  mental  life  of  human  beings,  the  assumption  is
              that  we  should  think  of  beliefs  and  desires  as  resembling  symbols  whose
              formal  relations and patterns of  derivation would be  determined  according
              to  the  rules  of  some  mental  "program."^  But  perhaps  even  more
              important  is  the  notion  of  a  rule  as  a  rigid  and  programmable  operation
              that  is  to  be  performed  upon  the  symbol  in  an  explicitly  specified  way
              under  precisely  specified  conditions. Convenient  models  of  such  rules  are
              found  in  algebra  and  other  forms  of  discrete  mathematics,  and  in  formal
              logic.^  Thus  for  a  tradition  that  had  long  conceived  of  thinking  as  a  kind




                ^ An intriguing critique of current cognitive  psychology and the computer  model  of
              the  mind  from  a  Continental  perspective  has  recently  been  advanced  by  Fred  Evans,
             Psychology and Nihilism: A  Geneohgical  Critique  of the Computational Model of  Mind,
              (Albany:  State  University  of  New  York  Press,  1992).  Chapter  5  includes  an  explicit
              treatment  of  connectionism,  which  is  followed  in  the  next  chapter  by  a  critique  of
              cognitive psychology  that draws on Merleau-Ponty's  notion of the  "body-subject."

                ^Tienson 1991,1.
                ^ See here especially Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 8-14.

                ^ Tienson  1991:  "Connectionist  mathematics  is  the  mathematics  of  dynamical
              systems; its equations look like equations in a physics text book. The mathematics of the
              classical  picture  is  discrete  mathematics.  Its  formulae  look  comfortingly  (to  the
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