Page 144 - Contribution To Phenomenology
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THE OTHER CULTURE                        137

              ego  that  it  is  mine,  in  which  case  to  ascribe  ego  to  an  other  would
              involve  a  contradiction.  From  the  transcendental  egological  stance  which
              Husserl  adopts,  it  is  indeed  necessary  to  explain  how I  could  at  all  speak
              of  the  other  ego.  How  am  I  able  to  transfer  the  predicate  "ego"  from
              my  own  case,  where  it  has  its  original  home,  to  the  other—more
              specifically,  to  the  appearing  body over  there?  Whatever  may be  Husserl's
              account  in  the  Fifth  Meditation,  that  is  not  my  present  concern.  I
              assume,  he  shows,  in  his  own  terms,  starting  from  the  reduced  sphere
              of  my  ownness,  how  I  can  step-by-step  constitute  the  sense  "other  ego,"
              and  meaningfully  (not  necessarily  truly,  for  the  other  body  in  my
              perceptual  space  may  be  hallucination,  an  apparition,  a  mannequin  or  a
              wax  figure)  ascribe  ego  to  the  other.
                  Can  we  pose  a  similar  problem,  at  the  level  of  philosophical
              abstraction,  with  regard  to  the  other  culture,  and  ask  how  is  the sense
              "other  culture"  constituted  for  a  member  of  the  home  culture?  Most
              social  scientists,  when  they  raise  methodological  questions  regarding
              knowing other cultures—thereby asking questions pertaining to the  insider-
              outsider  situation  or  Kenneth  Pike's  etic-emic  distinction^—are  really
              asking  questions  regarding  the  epistemological  basis  of  their  sciences.  In
              general,  they  are  asking,  how  can  the  investigator,  belonging  as  he  does
              to  his  own  home  culture,  forge  an  access  to  the  native's  world—his
              language,  beUefs,  thoughts  and  desires,  in  fine,  to  his  "conceptual
              framework."  The  concern  is  analogous,  on  an  individual  level,  to  the
              skeptical  worry,  how  can  I  know  what  is  transpiring  in  his  mind?  Just  as
              the  last  worry  presupposes  that  I  already  have  available  to  me  the  sense
              "other  mind,"  so  does  the  social  scientist's  epistemological  concern
              presuppose  that  he  has  aheady  available  to  him  the  sense  "other
              culture." Just  as  in  the  former  case,  there  is  the  transcendental  question
              "How  is  the  sense  *alter ego'  constituted?," so  in  the  latter  case  one  may
             want  to  press  a  transcendental  question  "How  is  the  sense  "other
              culture" constituted?"










                ^  For  these  debates,  see  Hedland,  Pike  and  Harris,  Ernies  and  Etics.  The  In-
             sider/Outsider Debate  (Frontiers of  Anthropology vol. 7). Newbury  Park: Sage  Publica-
              tions, 1990.
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