Page 149 - Contribution To Phenomenology
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142                      /. N, MOHANTY

              of  familiarities"  (Unbekanntheiten  im  still  der  Bekanntheiten), they  are
              understood  as  "possibilities  for  experience"  (ibid,  430).
                  Taken  together  with  various  remarks  I  made  earlier  (to  the  effect
              that  within  the  home-culture,  there  is  also  an  other),  the  above  implies
              that  the  contrast  between  the  home  and  familiar  culture  and  the  foreign,
              the  unfamiliar  is  a  permanent  feature  of  every **world" (ibid,  431),  one
              does  not  have  to  go  out  to  meet  the  other,  the  unfamiliar,  the  unintel-
              ligible,  the  strange,  the  unknown.  One  meets  it  within  one's  own  home
              world.
                  The  other,  the  alien,  is  the  limit  to  the  understood  and  the  known.
              The  native  is  "foreign"  because,  and  in  so,  far  as  he  is  different,  he  is
              different  because,  and  in  so  far  as  he  is  not  understood.  Even  when  the
              social  scientist,  or  the  empathetic  traveller  understands  the  native,  this
              understanding  can  overcome  the  foreignness  (Fremdheit),  only when  it  is
              based  on  mutual  communication.  More  often  than  not,  the  attempt  to
              understand  the  other  is,  in  such cases,  one-sided. The  scientist  "observes"
             and  "interprets"  the  native.  At  most,  there  is  an  informant  who  "tran-
             slates"  the  native's  speech  for  the  scientist.  Only when  this  one-way  track
             of  "making  sense"  of  the  native  is  overcome  by  the  "mutuahty"  of
             "making  sense"  of  each  other,  the  foreignness  is  overcome.  A  common
             world,  mutually  shared,  thereby  begins  to  constitute  itself.
                  In  view  of  the  fact  that  there  is  the  other's  homeworld  which  is
             different  from  mine,  which  I  do  not  fully  understand, and  also  in  view  of
             the  fact  that  even  within  my  home-world  not  everyone  has  the  same
             access  to  all  its  dimensions  ("science,"  "reUgion,"  "music"  etc.)—how  is
             it  possible  to  say  that  we  all  experience—in  some  sense  of  "experien-
             cing"—the one  and  the same  world? Husserl  asks  this question repeatedly
             in  the  intersubjectivity  papers.  What  does  the  identical  world  and  the
             constitution  of  it  mean,  how  is  the  subject  as  subject  "for"  this  world
             constituted?  ("Was  besagt  da  identische  Welt  and  Konstitution derselben,
             was  characterisiert  die  Subjekte  als  Subjekte  *fur'  diese  Welt?")  (Hua
             XV,  228).  The  question,  for  him,  amounts  to  asking:

                      . . .  to  what  extent  and  how  far I  can  take  over,  through  understand-
                     ing,  their  (i.e.,  of  the  strangers')  experiential  structures,  and  so  can
                     progress  towards a  synthesis  of  their  homeworld  with  mine?  How  do I
                     arrive  at,  and I  must, a  comprehensive  consistency?

                     (.  .  .  inwiefern  ich  und  wie  weit  ich  ihre  (die  Fremden).
                     Erfahrungsgestalten  in Nachverstehen uhemehmen,  also zu einer  Synthesis
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