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2/36 Risk Assessment Process
           done by making comparisons with similar sections owned by   main root cause was actually soil movements that will damage
           the company or with industry-wide leak rates, as well as by   any coating, eventually leading to a repeat leak (discounting the
           benchmarking against specific other companies or by a combi-   role of other corrosion preventions; see Chapter 3). In this case,
           nation of these.                           the  leak  penalty  in  the  risk  assessment  should have  been
            Note that an event history is only useful in predicting hture   removed only after addressing the soil issue, not simply the
           events to the extent that conditions remain unchanged. When   coating repair.
           corrective actions are applied, the event probability changes.   This example illustrates that the investigators stopped the
           Any adjustment for leak frequency should therefore be reana-   analysis too  early  by  not  determining the  causes  of  the
           lyzed periodically.                        damaged coating. The root  is often a system of causes that
                                                      should be defined in the analysis step. The very basic under-
           Visual inspections                         standing of cause and effect is that every effect has causes
                                                      (plural). There is rarely  only one root cause. The focus of
           A visual inspection of an internal or external pipe surface may   any investigation or risk  assessment is ultimately on effec-
           be triggered by an ILI anomaly investigation, a leak, a pressure   tive solutions that prevent recurrence. These effective solu-
           test,  or  routine maintenance. If  a  visual  inspection  detects   tions are found by being very diligent in the analysis step (the
           pipe  damage, then  the  respective  failure  mode  score  for   causes).
           that segment of pipe should reflect the new evidence. Points   A typical indication of an incomplete analysis is missing evi-
           can be  reassigned  only after a root cause analysis has been   dence. Each cause-and-effect relationship should be validated
           done and demonstrates that the damage mechanism has been   with evidence. If we  do not have evidence, then the cause-
           permanently removed.                       and-effect relationship cannot be validated. Evidence must be
            For risk  assessment purposes,  a visual  inspection is often   added to all causes in the analysis step.
           assumed to reflect conditions for some length ofpipe beyondthe   In the previous example, the investigators were missing the
           portions actually viewed. A conservative zone some distance   additional causes and its evidence to causally explain why the
           either side of the damage location can be assumed. This should   coating was damaged. If the investigators had evidence of coat-
           reflect the degree of belief and be conservative. For instance, if   ing damage, then the next question should have been “Why was
           poor coating condition is observed in one site, then poor coating   the coating damaged?” A thorough analysis addresses the sys-
           condition  should be  assumed for as far  as those  conditions   tem of causes. If investigators cannot explain why the coating
           (coating type and age, soil conditions, etc.) might extend.   was damaged then they have not completed the investigation.
             As  noted  earlier,  penalties  from  visual  inspections are   Simply repairing the coating is not going to be an effective
           removed through root cause analysis and removal of the root   solution.
           cause. Historical records of leaks and visual inspections should   Technically, there is no end to a cause-and-effect chain-
           included in the risk assessment even if they do not completely   there is no end to the “Why?” questions. Common terminology
           document the inspection, leak cause, or repair as is often the   includes  mot cause, direct cause, indirect cause, main cause,
           case. Because root cause analyses for events long ago are prob-   primaty cause, contributing cause, proximate cause, physical
           lematic, and their value in a current condition assessment is   cause, and so on. It is also true that between any cause-and-
           arguable,  the  weighting  of  these  events  is  often  reduced,   effect relationship there are more causes that can be added-we
           perhaps in proportion to the event’s age.   can always ask more “Why?” questions between any cause and
                                                      effect. This allows an analysis to  dig into whatever level of
           Root cause analyses                        detail is necessary.
                                                        The critical point here is that the risk evaluator should not
           Pipeline damage is very strong evidence of failure mechanisms   discount  strong  direct evidence  of  damage  potential unless
           at  work.  This  should be  captured  in  the  risk  assessment.   there  is  also compelling evidence  that the  damage-causing
           However, once the cause of the damage has been removed, if it   mechanisms have been permanently removed.
           can be, then the risk assessment should reflect the now safer
           condition. Determining and removing the cause of a failure
           mechanism is not always easy. Before the evidence provided by   V.  Lessons learned in establishing a risk
           actual damage is discounted, the evaluator should ensure that   assessment program
           the true underlying cause has been identified and addressed.
           There are no rules for determining when a thorough and com-   As the primary ingredient in a risk management system, a risk
           plete investigation has been performed. To help the evaluator   assessment process or model must first be established. This is
           make such a judgment, the following concepts regarding root   no  small  undertaking and,  as with  any undertaking, is best
           cause analyses are offered [32].           accomplished with the benefit of experience. The following
             A root cause analysis is a specialized type of incident inves-   paragraphs  offer some insights gained through development of
           tigation process  that  is  designed  to  find  the  lowest  level   many pipeline risk management programs for many varied cir-
           contributing causes to the incident. More conventional investi-   cumstances.  Of course, each situation is unique and any rules of
           gations often fail to arrive at this lowest level.   thumb are necessarily general and subject to many exceptions
             For example, assume that a leak investigation reveals that a   to the rules. To some degree, they also reflect a personal prefer-
           failed coating contributed to a leak. The coating is subsequently   ence, but nonetheless are offered here as food for thought for
           repaired and the previously assigned leak penalty is removed   those embarking on  such  programs. These insights  include
           from the risk assessment results. But then, a few years later,   some key points repeated from the first two chapters of this
           another leak appears at the same location. It turns out that the   book.
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