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2/40 Risk Assessment Process
            In the second part of the evaluation, an assessment is made of   tion for a section govern the point assignment. The rationale for
          the potential consequences of a pipeline failure. Product char-   this is discussed in Chapter 1. For instance, if a 5-mile section
          acteristics, pipeline operating conditions, and the pipeline sur-   of pipeline has 3 ft of cover for all but 200 ft of its length (which
          roundings are considered in arriving at a consequence factor.   has only 1 ft of cover), the section is still rated as if the entire 5-
          The consequence score is called the leak impact factor and   mile  length has  only  1 ft of cover. The evaluator can  work
          includes acute as well as chronic hazards associated with prod-   around this though his choice of section breaks (see Sectioning
          uct releases. The leak impact factor is combined with the index   of the Pipeline section earlier in this chapter). Using modem
          sum (by dividing) to arrive at a final risk score for each section   segmentation strategies, there is no reason to have differing risk
          of pipeline. The end result is a numerical risk value for each   conditions within the same pipeline segment.
          pipeline section.  All of the information incorporated into this
          number is preserved  for a detailed analysis, if required. The   Relative   Unless a  correlation to absolute risk  values has
          higher-level variables of the entire process can be seen in the   been established, point values are meaningfid only in a relative
          flowchart in Figure 2.4.                   sense. A point score for one pipeline section only shows how
                                                     that section compares with other scored sections. Higher point
          Basic assumptions                          values represent increased safety-decreased  probability of
                                                     failure-in   all index values (Chapters 3 through 6). Absolute
          Some general assumptions are built into the relative risk assess-   risk values can be correlated to the relative risk values in some
          ment model discussed in Chapters 3 through 7. The user, and   cases as is discussed in Chapter 14.
          especially, the customizer of this system, should be aware of
          these and make changes where appropriate.   Judgment bused   The example point schedules reflect experts’
                                                     opinions based  on their interpretations of pipeline industry
          Independence   Hazards are assumed to be additive but inde-   experience as  well  as  personal pipelining experience. The
          pendent.  Each  item  that  influences the  risk picture is  con-   relative importance of  each  item  (this  is  reflected  in  the
          sidered  separately from  all  other  items-it   independently   weighting  of the  item) is  similarly the  experts’ judgments.
          influences the risk. The overall risk assessment combines all of   If sound, statistical data are available, they are incorporated
          the independent factors to get a final number. The final number   into these judgments.  However,  in  many  cases, useful  fie-
          reflects the “area of opportunity” for a failure mechanism to be   quency-of-occurrence data  are not  available.  Consequently,
          active because the number of independent factors is believed to   there is an element of subjectivity  in this approach.
          be directly proportional to the risk.
            For example, if event B can only occur if event A has first   Public   Threats to the general  public  are of most  interest
          occurred, then event B is given a lower weighting to reflect the   here. Risks specific to pipeline operators and pipeline company
          fact that there is a lower probability of both events happening.   personnel can be included as an expansion to this system, but
          However, the example risk model does not normally stipulate   only with great care since a careless addition may interfere with
          that event B cannot happen without event A.   the objectives ofthe evaluation. In most cases, it is believed that
                                                     other possible consequences will be  proportional to  public
          Worst case   When multiple conditions exist within the same   safety risks, so the focus on public safety will usually fairly
          pipeline segment, it is recommended that the worst-case condi-   represent most risks.












                                           I   Index sum











                                     Figure 2.4  Flowchart of relative risk index system.
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