Page 66 - Pipeline Risk Management Manual Ideas, Techniques, and Resources
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Riskvariables 3/45
                                                          Risk variables
               their burial 2.5 to 3 feet deep. However, encroachments ofpop-
               ulation and land development activities are routinely threaten-   Many mitigation measures are in place in most Western coun-
               ing many pipelines today.                  tries to reduce the threat of third-party damages to pipelines.
                 In  the  period  from  1983 through  1987, eight  deaths,  25   Nonetheless, recent  experience in most countries shows that
               injuries,  and  more  than  $14  million  in  property  damage   this remains a major threat, despite often mandatory systems
               occurred in the hazardous liquid pipeline industry due solely to   such as one-call  systems. Reasons  for continued third-party
               excavation damage by others. These types of pipeline failures   damage, especially in urban areas, include
               represent 259 accidents out of a total of 969 accidents from all
               causes. This means that 26.7% of all hazardous liquid pipeline
               accidents were caused by excavation damage 1871.   Smaller  contractors  ignorant  of  permit  or  notification
                 In the gas pipeline  industry, a  similar story emerges: 430   process
               incidents  from  excavation  damage  were  reported  in  the   No  incentive  for  excavators to  avoid damaging  the  lines
               1984-1987 period. These accidents resulted in 26 deaths,  148   when repair cost (to damaging party) is smaller than avoid-
               injuries,  and  more  than  $18  million  in  property  damage.   ance cost
               Excavation damage is thought to be responsible for 10.5% of   Inaccurate mapshecords
               incidents reported for distribution systems, 22.7% of incidents   Imprecise locations by operator.
               reported for transmissiodgathering pipelines, and 14.6% of all
               incidents in gas pipelines [87]. European gas pipeline experi-   Many of these situations  are evaluated as variables in the
               ence, based on almost  1.2 million mile-years of operations in   suggested risk assessment model.
               nine Western European countries, shows that third-party inter-   The pipeline designer an4 perhaps to an even greater extent,
               ference represents approximately 50% of all pipeline failures   the operator can affect the probability of damage from third-
               [441.                                      party activities.  As an element ofthe total risk picture, the prob-
                                                          ability of accidental third-party damage to a facility depends on

               Exposure                                    The ease with which the facility can be reached by  a third
                                                           party
               To quantify the risk exposure from excavation damage, an esti-   The frequency and type ofthird-party activities nearby.
               mate of the total number of excavations that present a chance
               for  damage  can be made. Reference  1641 discusses the Gas   Possible offenders include
               Research Institute’s (GRI’s) 1995 study that makes an effort to
               determine risk exposure for the gas industry. The  study sur-   Excavating equipment
               veyed  65  local  distribution  companies  and  35 transmission   Projectiles
               companies regarding line hits. The accuracy of the analysis was   Vehicular traffic
               limited by the response-less  than half (41 %) of the companies   Trains
               responded, and several major gas-producing states were poorly   Farming equipment
               represented  (only one respondent  from Texas  and  one  from   Seismic charges
               Oklahoma). The GRI estimate was determined by extrapolation   Fenceposts
               and may be subject to a large degree of error because the data   Telephone posts
               sample was not representative.              Wildlife (cattle, elephants, birds, etc.)
                 Based  on  survey  responses,  however,  GFU  calculated  an   Anchors
               approximate  magnitude  of  exposure.  For  those  companies   Dredges.
               that responded, a total of25,123 hits to gas lines were recorded
               in  1993;  from  that,  the  GRI  estimated  total  U.S.  pipeline   Factors that affect the susceptibility of the facility include
               hits in 1993 to be 104,128. For a rate of exposure, this number
               can be compared to pipeline miles: For 1993, using a reported   Depth of cover
               1,778,600  miles  of  gas  transmission,  main,  and  service   Nature of cover (earth, rock, concrete, paving, etc.)
               lines, the calculated exposure rate was 58 hits per  1000 line   Man-made barriers (fences, barricades, levees, ditches. etc.)
               miles. Transmission lines had a substantially lower experience:   Natural barriers (trees, rivers, ditches, rocks, etc.)
               a rate of 5.5 hits per 1000 miles, with distribution lines suffer-   Presence of pipeline markers
               ing 71 hits per  1000 miles [64]. All rates are based on limited   Condition of right ofway (ROW)
               data.                                       Frequency and thoroughness of patrolling
                 Because  the risk of excavation damage is associated with   Response time to reported threats.
               digging activity rather than  system size, “hits  per digs” is a
               useful measure of risk exposure. For the same year that GRI   The activity level is often judged by items such as:
               conducted  its survey, one-call  systems collectively  received
               more  than  an  estimated  20  million  calls  from  excavators.   Population density
               (These  calls  generated  300  million  work-site  notifications   Construction activities nearby
               for  participating  members  to  mark  many  different  types of   Proximity and volume of rail or vehicular traffic
               underground  systems.) Using GRI’s estimate of hits. the risk
               exposure rate for 1993 was 5 hits per 1000 notifications to dig
               ~41.                                        Number of other buried utilities in the area.
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