Page 70 - Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies
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58 JORGE LARRAIN

            general, nor was it conceived as an illusion; it was a very specific form of
            distortion. The notion of false consciousness on its own is problematic and
            quite different from Marx’s concept of ideology. In this I agree with Hall
            and other critics. First, it is an equivocal expression for it can convey both
            the idea of a distortion and the idea that such distortion is an invention or
            a delusion of individual consciousness, a mirage without any base in reality.
            I  contend  that  Marx’s  concept  of  ideology  entails  the  former  but  not  the
            latter idea. I underline the fact that the problem here is ambiguity and not
            that false consciousness, of itself and necessarily, entails the connotation of
            deception by individual subjects.
              Second,  if  ideology  is  simply  defined  as  false  consciousness  the
            impression is given that it is a mere cognitive or epistemological problem
            which can be put right by criticism or science. Just like Habermas’s idea of
            systematically distorted communication, the notion of false consciousness
            does  not  make  any  explicit  reference  to  the  material  practices  and
            antagonisms  in  social  reality  which  contribute  to  its  emergence.  Ideology
            appears disconnected from the real social contradictions which give rise to
            it and therefore it can supposedly be dealt with at a purely discursive level
            without  requiring  any  alteration  of  social  reality.  Third,  and  most
            important, the expression ‘false consciousness’ is vague because it does not
            determine the kind of falsity which ideology entails. Its apparently universal
            and general scope seems to encompass all sorts of distortions and falsities as
            if they were ideological. In fact, ideology is equated with error and loses its
            identity  as  a  distinct  concept.  It  must  be  accepted  that  many  errors  and
            mistakes could exist which should not be necessarily treated as ideological
            distortions.  For  Marx  the  ideological  distortion  is  specific  and  makes  a
            necessary reference to the concealment of social contradictions.
              If there are any remaining doubts about this issue Marx dispels them in
            Capital. It is not the ruling class directly that dupes the working class; the
            very reality of the market relations creates a world of appearances which
            deceive  people.  Contrary  to  Hall’s  version,  Marx  never  thought  that  the
            material  reality  of  capitalism  would  directly  dispel  the  illusions  of  the
            workers. It was material reality itself that deceived them. But as Hall well
            realizes,  neither  deception  nor  liberation  from  deception  is  directly
            prescribed by economic relations. According to Marx, the operation of the
            market was


              a  very  Eden  of  the  innate  rights  of  man.  There  alone  rule  Freedom,
              Equality,  Property  and  Bentham.  Freedom,  because  both  buyer  and
              seller of a commodity, say of labour-power, are constrained only by
              their  own  free  will.  They  contract  as  free  agents  and  the  agreement
              they  come  to  is  but  the  form  in  which  they  give  legal  expression  to
              their  common  will.  Equality,  because  each  enters  into  relation  with
              the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange
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