Page 70 - Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies
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58 JORGE LARRAIN
general, nor was it conceived as an illusion; it was a very specific form of
distortion. The notion of false consciousness on its own is problematic and
quite different from Marx’s concept of ideology. In this I agree with Hall
and other critics. First, it is an equivocal expression for it can convey both
the idea of a distortion and the idea that such distortion is an invention or
a delusion of individual consciousness, a mirage without any base in reality.
I contend that Marx’s concept of ideology entails the former but not the
latter idea. I underline the fact that the problem here is ambiguity and not
that false consciousness, of itself and necessarily, entails the connotation of
deception by individual subjects.
Second, if ideology is simply defined as false consciousness the
impression is given that it is a mere cognitive or epistemological problem
which can be put right by criticism or science. Just like Habermas’s idea of
systematically distorted communication, the notion of false consciousness
does not make any explicit reference to the material practices and
antagonisms in social reality which contribute to its emergence. Ideology
appears disconnected from the real social contradictions which give rise to
it and therefore it can supposedly be dealt with at a purely discursive level
without requiring any alteration of social reality. Third, and most
important, the expression ‘false consciousness’ is vague because it does not
determine the kind of falsity which ideology entails. Its apparently universal
and general scope seems to encompass all sorts of distortions and falsities as
if they were ideological. In fact, ideology is equated with error and loses its
identity as a distinct concept. It must be accepted that many errors and
mistakes could exist which should not be necessarily treated as ideological
distortions. For Marx the ideological distortion is specific and makes a
necessary reference to the concealment of social contradictions.
If there are any remaining doubts about this issue Marx dispels them in
Capital. It is not the ruling class directly that dupes the working class; the
very reality of the market relations creates a world of appearances which
deceive people. Contrary to Hall’s version, Marx never thought that the
material reality of capitalism would directly dispel the illusions of the
workers. It was material reality itself that deceived them. But as Hall well
realizes, neither deception nor liberation from deception is directly
prescribed by economic relations. According to Marx, the operation of the
market was
a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom,
Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and
seller of a commodity, say of labour-power, are constrained only by
their own free will. They contract as free agents and the agreement
they come to is but the form in which they give legal expression to
their common will. Equality, because each enters into relation with
the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange