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60 JORGE LARRAIN

            For  Marx  neither  ideologically  distorted  ideas  nor  correct  ideas  can  be
            explained as emerging from an empiricist relation whereby the real world
            indelibly  imprints  its  meanings,  be  they  distorted  or  sound,  directly  into
            our  consciousness.  This  assumes  that  the  real  world  is  simple  and
            transparent  and  that  subjects  are  rather  passive  recipients.  For  Marx,  on
            the contrary, the real world of capitalism was not transparent; phenomenal
            forms  created  by  the  market  concealed  the  real  relations  at  the  level  of
            production. But subjects were not passive either, bound to be deceived or
            bound  to  scientifically  understand  reality;  they  were  actively  engaged  in
            practices which, in so far as limited and merely reproductive, enhanced the
            appearances  of  the  market,  in  so  far  as  transformatory  or  revolutionary,
            facilitated the apprehension of real relations.
              When  Hall  says  that  the  first  thing  to  ask  about  an  ideology  which
            succeeds  in  organizing  a  substantial  section  of  the  masses  is  not  what  is
            false about it but what about it is true, he overlooks two things. First, in
            talking  about  an  ideology  which  succeeds  in  organizing  masses,  he
            is  clearly  using  a  neutral  concept  of  ideology  in  the  Gramscian  tradition.
            Marx worked with a different, negative concept and, therefore, to criticize
            him  for  not  putting  the  problem  of  ideology  in  terms  of  political  ideas
            which  become  popular  does  not  make  good  sense.  Second,  even  if  one
            accepts Hall’s Gramscian definition of ideology as useful, as I do, he does
            not  seem  to  see  the  different  but  complementary  contribution  which
            Marx’s concept of ideology could make to it. For why should we restrict
            ourselves  to  finding  out  what  makes  good  sense  in  an  ideology?  Is  it  not
            also quite necessary to find out what is wrong and expose it? Assuming that
            nazism and fascism were ideologies in the Gramscian sense which, however
            unexpectedly,  succeeded  in  organizing  important  sections  of  the  German
            and Italian masses, was it not important to find out not only what was true
            about them, the good sense which seduced people into accepting them, but
            also to find out and expose what was false and did not make good sense
            about them?
              Finally, Hall castigates Marx’s theory for assuming that vast numbers of
            ordinary  people  could  be  duped  into  misrecognizing  where  their  real
            interests lie, whereas a few privileged theoreticians could see right through
            into  the  truth.  But  this  is  a  misunderstanding.  For  misrecognition,  in
            Marx’s terms, had nothing to do with the mental equipment or intelligence
            of people. The concept of ideology was not a device to label a part of the
            community  as  stupid  or  less  intelligent.  According  to  Marx,  capitalists
            themselves, just as much as the workers, as the bearers and agents of the
            capitalist system, were deceived by the very operation of the market. As he
            put it,

              The final pattern of economic relations as seen on the surface, in their
              real  existence  and  consequently  in  the  conceptions  by  which  the
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