Page 186 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo

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THE KOSOVO CRISIS—THE MICRO REVIEW
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was decisive.” It became clear after Racak that even an enhanced ver-
sion of the status quo was not enough. A leading American newspaper
described the NSC decisions of January 15 most succinctly by
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characterizing them as “obsolete at birth.”
At the U.S. State Department, the shift in policy began to germi-
nate almost immediately after the massacre. In devising a new
approach, it was clear that the incremental measures of past months
had failed and that the conflicting parties could not reach an agree-
ment on their own—they had to be pushed into an interim political
settlement devised by the West. In developing this new approach, an
idea by U.S. NATO ambassador Alexander Vershbow, involving the
creation of an international protectorate in Kosovo, by force if neces-
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sary, was recognized as a central element. The new policy, in essence,
contained four elements:
1. Devise an interim settlement based on principles agreed to by
the Contact Group, with an autonomous Kosovo protectorate
as its core;
2. Demand attendance of conflicting parties to a conference to
agree to the interim settlement;
3. Enforce interim settlement with an international implementa-
tion force; 82
4. Force parties to sign agreement with a credible ultimatum
threatening force for nonagreement. 83
The policy shift was officially initiated during another NSC
principals meeting on January 19 that was called in response to Racak.
At this meeting, Albright received overwhelming support for the new
approach from the same group that had rejected her approach just
four days before. According to National Security Advisor Sandy
Berger, Albright found herself “pushing on an open door” at this
meeting. 84 The next day Clinton signed off on the new policy.
The major shift in policy involved forcing the conflicting sides to
agree to an interim settlement. Previous policy that attempted to
encourage and coerce the two sides to come together and negotiate
on their own settlement had proven ineffective. For months,
Christopher Hill, the U.S. ambassador to Macedonia, had been
engaged in intense shuttle diplomacy. However, by January 1999, he
was no closer in making progress than he had been the previous sum-
mer when diplomacy began. 85 Previous attempts to threaten force
were now perceived as problematic because they were not attached to
any particular political plan. In explaining the new policy to U.K.