Page 189 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo

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THE CNN EFFECT IN ACTION
decision–making. The process by which the new Kosovo policy was
developed and approved, from an American perspective, involved
essentially five steps:
1. Development of new policy by Albright and the U.S. State
Department;
2. Approval by the U.S. National Security principals;
3. Approval by the U.S. president;
4. Approval by U.S. Congress (in the case of war); and
5. Approval by other NATO members.
At each step along the chain of approval, there is evidence showing
that the media influenced a shift in the political landscape and enabled
a policy of military intervention to be approved. While the State
Department under Albright was in favor of a military solution for
some time, the Racak massacre dramatically strengthened its short-
term bargaining position and gave it a window of opportunity to push
its position forward. According to Albright, “That still something like
Racak could happen I think was really energizing to all of us to say we
89
That plan was pre-
can’t go on like this, this requires a larger plan.”
sented several days later to the National Security team, where Albright
faced little resistance in pushing for the new policy. According to
National Security Advisor Sam Berger, who was present at this meeting,
“Racak was so brutal that I think there was ...a much clearer sense
that we had to take action.” 90 The new policy also did not have any
opposition from the president, who approved the proposal the next
day and then engaged on a campaign to sell the policy to European
allies. A similar sentiment was also present in many European capi-
tals. 91 For example, in Germany—a NATO member traditionally
amongst the most reluctant to consider the use of force—there was a
strong shift toward the military option after Racak. According to
German foreign minister Joschka Fisher, “If people are being massa-
cred, you cannot mutter about having no mandate. You must act.” 92
Later, he admitted that Racak “became the turning point for me,” and
war the only answer. 93
Perhaps the greatest transformation in policy position occurred
in the U.S. legislature. Before the Racak incident, the majority in
the U.S. Congress had opposed U.S. military involvement in
Kosovo. This is why earlier demands for the introduction of a reso-
lution by certain members had largely been ignored. 94 After the
Racak incident, however, there was a remarkable shift amongst
many previously opposing members of Congress. According to