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THE CNN EFFECT IN ACTION
passage was not mandatory to commence Western military action over
Kosovo, it provided a critical endorsement of the Clinton administra-
tion, indicating broad national support for the government’s policy.
At all levels, it seemed, media images were mentioned as a factor
influencing decision-makers to support the military intervention.
Phase 7: February 15 to March 24, 1999
The Rambouillet Conference dominated the period between mid-
February and the beginning of the NATO intervention. To some
observers, the conference was really a prelude to war, as the West
attempted to impose conditions that would almost certainly be
rejected by the FRY, including foreign troops on Serbian soil.
Rambouillet subsequently received much criticism for being too one-
sided in favor of the Kosovo Albanians, offering no carrots to the Serb
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side and no effective sticks against the Albanian side.
In attending the conference, organizers assumed that both parties
implicitly agreed to a 26-point plan that was presented. This plan
was the latest draft of Chris Hill’s three-year interim settlement.
Some of its leading principles included self-government for Kosovo,
democratically elected institutions, respect for human rights, and an
end to violence. While both sides agreed to these points in principle,
they disagreed on their implementation. The Kosovo Albanians
sought to gain political rights in the short term and the right to out-
right independence in the long term, while the FRY argued that
Albanians were only one of many ethnic groups in Kosovo. From the
FRY position, the autonomy granted to Albanians after 1974 led to
a dictatorship by this majority ethnic group, and they opposed going
back to a similar arrangement. The thrust of their position was that
all ethnic groups in Kosovo should be treated equally, including
minorities such as the Serbs, Turks, and Roma. Such rationale was
manifested in the FRY’s delegation to the Rambouillet Conference,
which was called Belgrade’s “rainbow coalition.” 105 This difference
in interpretation, in a way, was only the smaller problem at
Rambouillet. The larger problem related to the security aspects of
the agreement, as NATO and the Albanian side insisted on an inter-
national force led by NATO to implement the settlement on the
ground in Kosovo, while the FRY made it clear that they would
never accept such an outcome.
After two weeks, neither side agreed to the demands of the settle-
ment. What was particularly embarrassing for West was the refusal of
the Kosovo Albanian delegation to sign, as it was their cause for which