Page 184 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo

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THE KOSOVO CRISIS—THE MICRO REVIEW
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The situation was
resolutions that referred to the KLA as terrorists.
further inflamed by a KLA attack on a tavern in the Serb dominated
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Kosovo city of Pec, killing six, including five teenagers. According to
State Department spokesman James Rubin, “Killing postmen or
killing Serb civilians in cold blood—those are terrorist acts that we do
believe wrong and unfortunately that was what the KLA was pursuing
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at the time.”
The increased violence was challenging the credibility of the
Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement, and even international monitors
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had by now come under attack.
On the day of January 15, a meet-
ing of the NSC principals committee took place in the White House
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basement to discuss Kosovo. Albright believed that the situation was
deteriorating and that the time had come to toughen the policy by
adding a political component that sought a settlement. The other
members, while also frustrated, did not support a more forceful pol-
icy, believing it to be too risky. Leading the opposition was William
Cohen, who was reluctant to engage in another Balkan conflict with
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no clear end in sight.
In the end, a 13-page classified Kosovo strat-
egy was approved, that was informally referred to as Status Quo
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Plus. This document suggested minor changes at both tactical A and
B levels to enhance the Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement, but nothing
that could seriously risk escalating tensions. To improve the situation
on the ground, the paper suggested enhancing the security of the
KVM monitors with helicopters and bodyguards, training Albanian
policemen, and beginning the planning for the promised Kosovo
election. All of these suggestions, of course, would need Milosevic’s
tacit approval. 71 The proposed changes outlined in the policy docu-
ment were largely cosmetic. According to Ivo Daalder, “The decision
by the principals is, no, we will just muddle through. Decisive
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actions, we just can’t stomach it.” Albright was reported to be frus-
trated after this decision, stating, “We’re like gerbils running on a
wheel.” 73
Phase 6:January 15 to February 14, 1999
On the same day that the NSC principals were meeting in the White
House, a massacre was unfolding in the Kosovo village of Racak that
would set in motion a chain of events leading to the NATO bombing
of the FRY 68 days later. For the third time in less than a year, the after-
math of a gruesome massacre of civilians was broadcast on Western
media channels. 74 More than anything else, the images exposed the
failings of existing Western policy, which appeared inadequate and