Page 96 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo
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                                                                                              THE KOSOVO CRISIS
                                                         the world’s media increasingly became interested in Kosovo once the
                                                         killing started, adding weight to the adage “If it bleeds, it leads.”
                                                                           Macro Influences
                                                         The Kosovo conflict of 1998 and 1999, perhaps like all wars,
                                                         occurred  under unique circumstances. Accounting for the macro
                                                         influences is important in understanding the potential impact of,
                                                         and limitations on, the CNN effect. If the events of Kosovo had
                                                         occurred in a different time, place, and political environment, the role
                                                         and result of the CNN effect might have been very different. Before
                                                         conducting the case study on the CNN effect during the prelude to
                                                         the Kosovo intervention, the following section reviews the political
                                                         culture, costs, and context in relation to the Kosovo crisis and a
                                                         potential military intervention.
                                                                            Western Political Culture
                                                         The West’s appetite for intervention would likely have been very dif-
                                                         ferent had it not been in Kosovo and in 1998–1999. In terms of its
                                                         location, Kosovo was part of the former Yugoslavia—a place that had
                                                         over the 1990s become familiar to Westerners for the kind of out-
                                                         rages, such as ethnic cleansing, that had supposedly disappeared from
                                                         Europe decades before. Between 1991 and 1995, Western observers
                                                         and television audiences witnessed two brutal wars, ethnic cleansing,
                                                         and the worst massacre in Europe since World War II in Srebrenica. As
                                                         the Balkan wars persisted, the Serbian side was increasingly presented
                                                         as the bellicose aggressor. The primary motive assigned to it—the cre-
                                                         ation of a Greater Serbia at the expense of others—was considered
                                                         archaic and out of touch with the wider pan-European trends toward
                                                         unity and cooperation. By 1995, villains in Yugoslavia were clearly
                                                         established in Western minds and media frameworks. After the Bosnia
                                                         conflict, notions of good and evil were further reinforced as the full
                                                         scale of the devastation that had taken place in Srebrenica unfolded.
                                                         This led to a kind of collective guilt and shame in much of the West. 14
                                                         Many wondered how almost 8,000 men could have been slaughtered
                                                         in the middle of Europe in a place relatively close to the borders of the
                                                         European Union (EU) and, supposedly, a UN “safe haven.” By March
                                                         1998 when the Kosovo civil war began and the first news of a mas-
                                                         sacre emerged, it did not take much time for many in the West to
                                                         determine who was at fault. The Kosovo conflict was almost like the
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