Page 97 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo

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THE CNN EFFECT IN ACTION
latest chapter in the same book: It entailed the same villains—
Milosevic and the Serb nationalists; the same motives—Serb domina-
tion over other ethnic groups; and the same tactics—murder,
massacre, and ethnic cleansing. The only difference was that the new
victims were now Kosovo Albanians, whereas previously they had
been Muslims in Bosnia and Croats in Croatia.
The timing of the Kosovo conflict in 1998–1999 was also an
important determinant in the intervention for several reasons. First, it
was important because it happened after the Croatian and Bosnian
wars. Had the Kosovo crisis become violent in 1991 instead of 1998,
it might have taken years and many more thousands of deaths before
an intervention by Western powers. In a way, Bosnia’s sacrifice paved
the way for intervention in Kosovo. Second, the conflict emerged
close to the turn of the twenty-first century. Many Westerners, includ-
ing the West’s political leadership, were feeling the weight of their
time and desiring to enter the new century with a clean slate under a
more ethical set of principles. Massacres and ethnic cleansing had no
place in the new century and were part of the darkest periods of the
past century—a time many believed had now passed.
Political Cost
On the eve of the Kosovo intervention, President Bill Clinton went
on American television to explain his reasons for going to war.
During the speech, Clinton stated, “I do not intend to put ground
troops in Kosovo to fight a war.” 15 From a military perspective, this
declaration seemed naive, at best, as it revealed information that
could put NATO at a disadvantage by allowing the adversary to prepare
for the tactical choices that remained outside of a ground campaign.
But from a political perspective, many advisors believed that a ground
war could not be sold to the public in many NATO countries. This
concern was also demonstrated in how the air war was conducted.
During aerial bombing raids, concern over the loss of pilots meant
that fighters could only fly at 15,000 feet, placing them out of anti-
aircraft firing range. The same motive led to the decision not to
employ the tank-killing Apache helicopters. 16 Concern over a public
backlash from a high casualty count, also known as the “bodybag
effect,” meant that only low-risk modes of military engagement
would be followed. 17
Data from public opinion polls at the time seemed to support this
risk-averse approach. Although the majority of Americans supported
the air war throughout its entire duration, support for the war
declined significantly in hypothetical scenarios involving American