Page 98 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo
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                                                                                              THE KOSOVO CRISIS
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                                                         casualties in a ground war.  When asked “Would you still favor sending
                                                         ground troops to Kosovo if 100 American soldiers were killed?” only
                                                         24 percent of respondents stated yes, while 65 percent stated no.
                                                         These numbers fell to 20 percent in favor and 69 percent opposed if
                                                         500 Americans were killed, and 15 percent for and 72 percent against
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                                                         if 1,000 were killed.
                                                                             A similar trend was evident amongst leading
                                                         European NATO members, where support for a ground invasion was
                                                         always lower than for the air option that was actually employed. In
                                                         France and the United Kingdom, for example, which recorded the
                                                         highest level of support for the NATO action, support for a ground
                                                         war was generally at least 10 percent below that of the ongoing air
                                                         war. In Germany, support for the ground option was about 30 percent
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                                                         below that of the air campaign.
                                                           As such, the West’s decision to engage in Kosovo and the manner
                                                         in which this action was conducted were based largely on the costs
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                                                         associated with such a commitment.
                                                                                          If early planning had foreseen
                                                         the need for a full-scale ground war involving high Western casualties,
                                                         there would likely have been no military intervention in Kosovo.
                                                           As the qualified nature of Western involvement in Kosovo demon-
                                                         strated, military intervention was conditioned by the costs that the
                                                         interveners were willing to pay. It is questionable whether the media
                                                         could have been a factor in anything beyond the limited aerial bomb-
                                                         ing that was the centerpiece of the Kosovo intervention. Had ground
                                                         forces been used and casualties sustained, the pressures for withdrawal
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                                                         would likely have been great. Even Slobodan Milosevic seemed cog-
                                                         nizant of this fact, telling German foreign minister, Joschka Fisher,
                                                         “I can stand death—lots of it—but you can’t.” 23
                                                                               Political Context
                                                         The Kosovo civil war occurred in a unique period in Western history.
                                                         The 1990s marked the end of the cold war and a reduction in the
                                                         probability of nuclear annihilation or “A list” threats, as outlined
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                                                         earlier. During the cold war, world events were judged and strategic
                                                         decisions could be made in a relatively straightforward fashion. The
                                                         West knew who belonged to the “we” category and who was with the
                                                         enemy. The post–cold war world, however, was a far murkier terrain.
                                                         Nonetheless, many events involving violations of human rights still
                                                         outraged human sensitivities. During the cold war, such outrages
                                                         could be ignored for more important geopolitical interests, as the
                                                         West’s survival was ultimately at risk. The post–cold war 1990s, how-
                                                         ever, made such linkages difficult to establish and violation of human
                                                         rights more difficult to justify.
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