Page 427 - The Toyota Way Fieldbook
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400                       THE TOYOTA WAY FIELDBOOK


                Tenneco had recently hired a lean manufacturing expert, Pasquale
                Digirolamo, who agreed to dedicate almost all of his time to the plant
                for 8 to 12 months and treat it as a Tenneco lean pilot. Digirolamo
                and the plant manager, Glenn Drodge, met three times every day—a
                morning planning meeting, a midday review, and an end-of-day review.
                Digirolamo played a coaching role but was aggressive. He found the
                overall level of discipline in the plant to be weak and was fond of
                saying, “You get what you tolerate.” The Japanese consulting firm
                Shingijutsu had trained Digirolamo to lead radical kaizen workshops.
                He scheduled aggressive workshops every other week, in most cases
                setting up a complete manufacturing cell within the week. In the first
                six months, all subassembly operations were converted to cells. In
                the second six months, all final assembly operations became cells. The
                entire plant was laid out almost from scratch, and about 450 pieces of
                equipment were moved to the new layout. New shipping docks were
                built near the point of use. Primarily through the radical kaizen work-
                shops, the plant was virtually remade from the bottom up. This was
                kaikaku (radical transformation), not kaizen (continuous improvement).

                In preparation for this one-year radical remaking of the plant, Digirolamo
                estimated that the plant had 40 percent more workers than it should
                have. He recommended a one time layoff before the workshops began.
                Mostly temporary workers were let go as the plant relied heavily on
                agency workers. Other workers were offered Tenneco’s standard
                severance package, and enough took it to preclude involuntary
                layoffs for hourly employees. Some front-line supervisors were let
                go—people who did not have the management and leadership skills
                to perform in the new lean environment. The verbal commitment
                between the plant manager and Digirolamo essentially meant that
                Digirolamo was taking over the plant.
                The bottom-line results were striking. Digirolamo came in as sensei in
                November 2000. Some time was spent on stability issues. In January
                2001 lean deployment started seriously, led by the Smithville Lean
                Steering Committee. By April the plant had made a turnaround from
                below target to above target and other Tenneco plant managers were
                asking what was going on at Smithville. In the first year, labor cost was
                reduced by 39 percent, direct labor efficiency improved by 92 percent,
                total labor productivity went up by 56 percent, inventory dollars on
                hand were cut in half—freeing up $5 million in cash—external defects
                were reduced from 638 to 44 parts per million, and lead time was cut
                in half. In 2002 the plant for the first time received Toyota’s coveted
                quality and service award.

                In terms of the different approaches to change covered in this chapter,
                Smithville in this first year had used a radical version of the “kaizen
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