Page 228 - An Introduction to Political Communication Third Edition
P. 228

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

                 The fundamentally political logic of this approach was reinforced
               by the traditional secrecy of the British Civil Service and Defence
               Ministry. Military public relations in the Falklands conflict were
               handled in the first instance by the navy which, unlike the army in
               Northern  Ireland,  had  relatively  little  experience  of  information
               management.  The  army’s  PR  operation  in  Northern  Ireland  was
               sophisticated  and  (at  least  on  the  surface)  ‘open’  to  journalistic
               requirements (Miller, 1993). The navy, on the other hand, ‘lacked
               awareness of the media’s role in war and often appeared [in the
               Falklands] oblivious of the political need to win popular support at
               home and abroad’ (Mercer et al., 1987, p. 92). Naval PROs’ treat-
               ment of the journalists who accompanied the British expeditionary
               task force to the Falklands was often dismissive and uncooperative,
               to the extent indeed that it frequently came into conflict with the
               political requirements of the government, leading to a struggle of
               wills between competing public relations departments.
                 For example, when it was announced that the government would
               be dispatching a task force to retake the disputed islands, the naval
               authorities decided that no journalists would be permitted to travel
               with it. Only the personal intervention of Margaret Thatcher’s press
               secretary, Bernard Ingham, and the pressure which he put on her
               to recognise the negative publicity a complete ban on journalists
               would  attract,  persuaded  the  navy  to  reconsider.  In  the  end,
               after heated negotiations between British media organisations, the
               government and the military, 28 journalists travelled with the task
               force.
                 No non-British journalists were included in the pool, a fact cited
               by some observers in attempting to explain the frequently critical
               attitudes of the international community to the British position in
               the dispute (Harris, 1983). Although the international community
               in the end tolerated Mrs Thatcher’s military solution to the crisis,
               support was rarely wholehearted, and had the conflict been more
               protracted and bloody than it eventually turned out to be this could
               have become a serious political problem for the UK government.
               Had foreign journalists been involved in the media contingent, it
               has been argued, coverage of the British position might have been
               more sympathetic.
                 The military authorities’ reluctance to include journalists, even
               British,  in  the  task  force  was  an  illustration  of  the  impact  of
               the  Vietnam  experience  on  Western  attitudes  to  military  public
               relations. In 1977 the Ministry of Defence had prepared a secret
               paper  on  ‘Public  Relations  Planning  in  Emergency  Operations’,


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