Page 39 - Communication and the Evolution of Society
P. 39

16                         Communication  and  Evolution  of  Society

         indistinguishable  from  that  between  theory  and  reality  in  other
         nomological  sciences,  in  the  explicative  version  the  linguistic
         character  of  the  object  necessitates  a  relation  that  can  hold  only
         between  different  linguistic  expressions:  the  relation  between
         explication  and  explicandum,  where  the  language  of  explication
         (that  is,  the  construct  language  of  linguistic  science,  which  is  a
         standardized  version  of  ordinary  language)  belongs  in  principle
         to  the  same  level  as  the  natural  language  to  be  explicated.  (Nei-
         ther  in  the  descriptive  nor  in  the  explicative  case  of  theory  forma-
         tion  can  the  relation  of  linguistic  theory  to  its  object  domain  be
         conceived  as  that  of  metalanguage  to  object  language. )*°
            Theory  and  Everyday  Knowledge.  There  is  yet  another  pecu-
         liarity  arising  from  these  differently  oriented  conceptualizations.
         An  empirical-analytic  theory  in  the  narrow  sense  can  (and  as  a
         rule  will)  refute  the  everyday  knowledge  of  an  object  domain  that
         we  possess  prior  to  science  and  replace  it  with  a  correct  theoretical
         knowledge  regarded  provisionally  as  true.  A  proposal  for  recon-
         struction,  by  contrast,  can  represent  pretheoretical  knowledge
         more  or  less  explicitly  and  adequately,  but  it  can  never  falsify  it.
         At  most,  the  report  of  a  speaker’s  intuition  can  prove  to  be  false,
         but  not  the  intuition  itself.3*  The  latter  belongs  to  the  data,  and
         data  can  be  explained  but  not  criticized.  At  most,  data  can  be
         criticized  as  being  unsuitable,  that  is,  either  erroneously  gathered
         or  wrongly  selected  for  a  specific  theoretical  purpose.
           To  a  certain  extent,  reconstructions  make  an  essentialist  claim.
         Of  course,  one  can  say  that  theoretical  descriptions  correspond
         (if  true)  to  certain  structures  of  reality  in  the  same  sense  as
         reconstructions  bear  a  likeness  (if  correct)  to  the  deep  structures
         explicated.  On  the  other  hand,  the  asserted  correspondence  be-
         tween  a  descriptive  theory  and  an  object  allows  of  many  epis-
         temological  interpretations  other  than  the  realistic  (e.g.,  instru-
         mentalist  or  conventionalist).  Rational  reconstructions,  on  the
         contrary,  can  reproduce  the  pretheoretical  knowledge  that  they
         explicate  only  in  an  essentialist  sense;  if  they  are  true,  they  have
         to  correspond  precisely  to  the  rules  that  are  operatively  effective
         in  the  object  domain—that  is,  to  the  rules  that  actually  determine
         the  production  of  surface  structures.*7  Thus  Chomsky’s  correla-
         tion  assumption,  according  to  which  linguistic  grammar  is  rep-
   34   35   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43   44