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21 What Is Universal Pragmatics?

Universal Pragmatics versus Transcendental Hermeneutics

Having presented the idea of a reconstructive science and briefly
elucidated it through a consideration of reconstructive linguistics
(and two of its methodological difficulties), I would like to pose
one further question: what is the relation of universal-pragmatic
reconstruction of general and unavoidable presuppositions of pos-
sible processes of understanding to the type of investigation that
has, since Kant, been called transcendental analysis? Kant terms
transcendental an investigation that identifies and analyzes the a
priori conditions of possibility of experience. The underlying
idea is clear: in addition to the empirical knowledge that relates
to objects of experience, there is, supposedly, a transcendental
knowledge of concepts of objects in general that precedes ex-
perience. The method by which these a priori concepts of objects
in general can be shown to be valid conditions of possible ex-
perience is less clear. There is already disagreement concerning
the meaning of the thesis: ‘‘the a priori conditions of a possible
experience in general are at the same time conditions of the pos-
sibility of objects of experience.” *6
The analytic reception of the Kantian program (Strawson’s
work is a familiar example) *” leads to a minimalist interpretation
of the transcendental. Every coherent experience is organized in a
categorial network; to the extent that we discover the same 1m-
plicit conceptual structure in any coherent experience whatsoever,
we may call this basic conceptual system of possible experience
transcendental. This conception renounces the claim that Kant
wanted to vindicate with his transcendental deduction; it gives
up all claim to a proof of the objective validity of our concepts
of objects of possible experience in general.** The strong apri-
orism of Kantian philosophy gives way to a weaker version. From
now on, transcendental investigation must rely on the competence
of knowing subjects who judge which experiences may be called
coherent experiences in order to analyze this material for general
and necessary categorial presuppositions. Every reconstruction of
a basic conceptual system of possible experience has to be re-
garded as a hypothetical proposal that can be tested against new
experiences. As long as the assertion of its necessity and uni-