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DBS and the Structure of US Policy Making     123

           5.4  CONCLUSIONS

           A  detailed  analysis  of the  structural  conditions  characterizing  US
           foreign  communication  policy  and  the  historical  context  of  their
           development  for  the  most  part  has  been  absent  in  the  writings  of
           Schiller and other proponents of the cultural imperialism paradigm.
           As  such,  the dynamics  and implications  of the structural conditions
           addressed  in  this  chapter  have  been  underplayed.  The  bias  of US
           policy  making  that  was  perpetuated  by  these  conditions  can  be
           described  as  the  tendency  to  focus  on  short-term  issues  - such  as
           corporate plans in relation to an upcoming ITU conference - rather
           than relatively long-term concerns- such as a coordinated intra-state
           effort to institutionalise the free  flow  of information in international
           law.  Following the failed effort by State Department officials to take
           on  a  leadership  position  in  US  foreign  communication  policy,  the
           Senior  Interagency  Group  for  International  Communication  Policy
           provided  the  National  Security  Council with its  first  comprehensive
           overview of the policy problems in this field. 61   But despite these and
           lesser responses to the free flow crisis, the US public sector ultimately
           was incapable of meeting the long-term needs of its private sector.  A
           core component of this public sector inability readily to reform itself
           was  reflected  at and prior to WARC-79.  The extraordinary size  and
           complex make-up of the American delegation was the result of more
           than just the political and economic importance of the  conference. It
           also  reflected  the nature of US foreign  communication policy struc-
           tures.  The wealthiest,  best organized and most 'connected' American
           corporations,  rather  than just  being  heard  in  the  domestic  negotia-
           tions  that  preceded  the  meeting,  also  were  directly  represented  in
           Geneva. The assumed necessity of sending sixty-seven  officials and a
           forty-person  support staff underscored more than the  significance of
           international communications to the  United States; it  underlined (as
           early  as  1979)  the  presence  of  a  structural  disparity  between  the
           significance of free flow  and the ability of American state officials to
           act competently on behalf of free  flow  interests.
             These  structures  and  related  policy-making  biases  directly  influ-
           enced the domestic policy developments discussed in the next chapter.
           To  some  extent,  the  liberalization  of US  communication  activities,
           vigorously pursued in the early 1980s, generated an unforeseen escala-
           tion  of the foreign  communication policy crisis.  The haste and ideo-
           logical  fervor  in  which  US  communications  were  re-regulated
           ironically  hastened  the  efforts  of established  corporate  interests  to
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