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132                        Geoffrey Sykes


                             and  science;  and  the  experience  and  behaviour  of  participants  in  legal
                             domains. Kort‘s paper helps clarify the status of mathematical formalism and
                             the behavioural assumptions about legal decision.
                                 Fred  Kort  introduces  his  work  as  a  minor  but  pioneering  ―attempt‖  to
                             apply quantitative  methods to the depiction and prediction of  human events
                             that generally have been regarded as highly uncertain, namely, decisions by
                             ―at  least  one  area  of  judicial  review‖,  the  Supreme  Court  of  America.
                             Ambiguity  of  understanding  about  the  use  of  mathematical  techniques  is
                             signalled. On the one hand, there is the agenda of legal realism, to depict legal
                             processes informally and behaviourally, as social and ―human events‖ that are
                             ―highly uncertain‖, and serve to qualify the formalism of legal decisions. On
                             the  other  hand,  he  contests  suggestions  that  substitutional  formalism  of
                             quantification  automatically  will  help  predict,  and  hence  apparently  reduce,
                             uncertainty. The theme of the distinction between quantitative, mathematical
                             techniques and conventional legal reasoning is repeated when Kort discusses
                             the area of law that he has selected for investigation. The ―right to counsel‖
                             area was renowned for the irregularities of judgements by the Supreme courts,
                             concerning appeals from State courts where state counsel had been withheld
                             during criminal convictions.
                                 In  his  introduction,  Kort  is  explicit  about  some  of  the  features  of
                             quantitative  techniques,  which  aim  to  identify  the  factual  elements  of  some
                             cases of an area of law, to derive numeric values using formula and to predict
                             the  decisions  of  remaining  cases.  He  distinguishes  his  approach  from  other
                             kinds of conventional legal reasoning and hints at an implicit objectivism that
                             supplants  and  exceeds  legal  heuristics  and  will  be  made  ―independently  of
                             what Courts said by way of reasoning in these cases.‖
                                 Kort speaks as a political scientist, positioning his research as externalist
                             and  intervening  in  legal  institutions:  Kort  is  not  a  legal  professional.  Being
                             ―independent‖  from  legal  institutions,  he  consciously  adopts  methods
                             uncommon  in  its  internal  practice  to  research  the  nature  of  court  practices,
                             rules, procedures, norms, protocols, actors, precedents or setting. His unstated
                             public agenda is at least two fold: i) reform of policies of public law, which
                             will  be  achieved  by  ii)  close  monitoring  of  and  feedback  about  the  actual
                             decisions and behaviour of individual participants.
                                 His techniques of factor, probability and social analysis are developed on
                             sociometric principles, independent and even unknown by the court practice in
                             which they are applied. Kort recognises opposition to quantitative methods by
                             legal practitioners as being overly objectivist and arbitrary, quoting Justices of
                             the Supreme Court as saying that ―the due process clause is not susceptible of
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