Page 155 - Cultural Studies of Science Education

132 B.D. Rowe

Genetic manipulation entails the deliberate alteration of genetic sequences within the
genome. The same fundamental process of sequence alteration occurs as a result of
genetic selection, both natural (as with evolution) and artificial (as with selective breeding
of domesticated plants and animals). In terms of sequence alteration, the only significant
difference between genetic manipulation and genetic selection is that the former process
is very much faster than the latter. Thus, an assault on the ethics of transgenesis based on
a notion of the intrinsic wrongness of sequence manipulation would be sustainable only
as a subset of a much broader assault on all forms of deliberate sequence alteration
(DSA).” (p. 326)
In other words, humans have been modifying the genetic sequence of other species
for a very long time, and the only difference now with bioengineering is the speed
in which we do it. Thus, if we are to agree with the position of the intrinsic wrong-
ness of GMOs, we then are logically obligated – assuming we are to be consistent
in our thinking – to also deem it wrong to alter species via selective breeding.
Now, there are philosophers of animal rights (Regan 1983) who contest the
selective breeding of sentient nonhuman animals (most do not object to selec-
tive breeding of nonsentient plants). However, I venture to presume that most
people, without arguing that they are right, do not object to this traditional form
of DSA. But what would happen if we were to decide to make the “assault” that
Smith indicates above; that is, protest “all forms” of DSA, including selective
breeding? Such a conceptual reconfiguration, if actualized, would comprise
significant practical ramifications that would not only change the course of our
daily lives, but that would also threaten the very survival of our species. It has
been the human mastery of selective breeding – that is, modifying the genetic
code of other plant and animal species – that has helped us flourish on Earth as
Homo sapiens.
The point remains, however, that bioengineering is in fact very different from the
conventional methods of DSA. Even if we do not concede that genetic engineering
is outright immoral, this difference – the rapidity incumbent with biotechnology –
should make us view the process of species manipulation in a new way. Is the
degree of difference – that is, the reduced amount of time it takes to modify species’
genetic sequence to our desired end – enough reason to defend one method of
gene alteration but reject the other? If so, what exactly is the appropriate amount of
time – a few months, years, or a decade – where moral judgments change from
accepting sequence alteration as ethically permissible to rejecting it as ethically
reprehensible?
Rollin thinks the rapidity with which we can now change the genomes of other
species forces us to examine old questions in a new light. The advantage of conventional
sequence alteration is that one “had ample opportunity to observe the untoward
effects of one’s narrow selection for isolated characteristics” (p. 109). However,
with new technologies it is much more difficult to “detect the problematic aspects
of what we are doing until after the organism has been widely disseminated”
(p. 109). It seems now, given the accelerated pace of genome variation with bioen-
gineering, that we indeed have a new morally relevant characteristic that did not
exist with traditional methods of DSA.