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MEDIA STUDIES 121

              The televisual sign is a complex one. It is itself constituted by the combination
            of two types of discourse, visual and aural. Moreover, it is an iconic sign, in
            Peirce’s terminology, because ‘it possesses some of the properties of the thing
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            represented’.  This is a point which has led to a great deal of confusion and has
            provided the site of intense controversy in the study of visual language. Since the
            visual discourse translates a  three-dimensional  world into two-dimensional
            planes, it cannot, of course, be the referent or concept it signifies. The dog in the
            film  can  bark but  it  cannot bite! Reality exists outside language, but it  is
            constantly mediated by and through language: and what we can know and say
            has  to  be produced in and through discourse.  Discursive  ‘knowledge’  is the
            product not of the transparent representation of the ‘real’ in language but of the
            articulation of language on real relations  and conditions. Thus there is no
            intelligible discourse without the operation of a code. Iconic signs are therefore
            coded signs  too—even if the codes here work differently  from those of other
            signs.  There is  no degree  zero  in language.  Naturalism and ‘realism’— the
            apparent fidelity of the representation to the thing or concept represented—is the
            result, the effect, of a certain specific articulation of language on the ‘real’. It is
            the result of a discursive practice.
              Certain codes may, of course, be so widely distributed in a specific language
            community or culture, and be learned at so early an age, that they appear not to
            be constructed—the effect of an articulation between sign and referent—but to
            be  ‘naturally’  given. Simple  visual  signs appear to have achieved  a ‘near-
            universality’  in this  sense: though evidence  remains that  even apparently
            ‘natural’ visual codes are culture-specific. However, this does not mean that no
            codes have intervened; rather, that the codes have been profoundly naturalized.
            The operation of naturalized codes reveals not the transparency and ‘naturalness’
            of language but the depth, the habituation and the near-universality of the codes
            in use. They produce apparently ‘natural’ recognitions. This has the (ideological)
            effect of concealing the practices of coding which are present. But we must not be
            fooled by appearances. Actually, what  naturalized codes demonstrate  is  the
            degree of  habituation produced when there  is a fundamental  alignment  and
            reciprocity—an achieved equivalence— between  the encoding  and  decoding
            sides of an exchange of meanings. The functioning of the codes on the decoding
            side will frequently assume the status of naturalized perceptions. This leads us to
            think that the visual sign for ‘cow’ actually is (rather than represents) the animal,
            cow. But if we think of the visual representation of a cow in a manual on animal
            husbandry—and, even more, of the linguistic sign ‘cow’—we can see that both,
            in different degrees, are arbitrary with respect to the concept of the animal they
            represent. The articulation of an arbitrary sign— whether visual or verbal—with
            the concept of a referent is the product not of nature but of convention, and the
            conventionalism of discourses requires the intervention, the support, of codes.
            Thus Eco has argued that iconic signs ‘look like objects in the real world because
            they reproduce the conditions (that is, the codes) of perception in the viewer’. 5
            These ‘conditions of perception’ are, however, the result of a highly coded, even
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