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MEDIA STUDIES 125

            does not know the terms employed, cannot follow the complex logic of argument
            or exposition, is unfamiliar with the language, finds the concepts too alien or
            difficult or is foxed by the expository narrative. But more often broadcasters are
            concerned that  the audience has failed to take the  meaning as they—the
            broadcasters—intended. What they really mean to say is that viewers are not
            operating within the ‘dominant’  or  ‘preferred’ code.  Their ideal is ‘perfectly
            transparent communication’. Instead, what they have to confront is
            ‘systematically distorted communication’. 13
              In recent years discrepancies of this  kind have usually been explained by
            reference to ‘selective perception’. This is the door via which a residual pluralism
            evades the compulsions of a highly structured, asymmetrical and non-equivalent
            process. Of course, there will always be private, individual, variant readings. But
            ‘selective perception’ is almost never as selective, random or privatized as the
            concept suggests.  The  patterns exhibit,  across individual variants, significant
            clusterings. Any new approach to audience studies will therefore have to begin
            with a critique of ‘selective perception’ theory.
              It was argued earlier that since there is no necessary correspondence between
            encoding and decoding, the former can attempt to ‘pre-fer’ but cannot prescribe
            or guarantee the latter, which has its own conditions of existence. Unless they are
            wildly aberrant, encoding will have the effect of constructing some of the limits
            and parameters within which  decodings  will operate. If  there were no limits,
            audiences could simply read whatever they liked into any message. No doubt
            some total misunderstandings of this kind do exist. But the vast range must contain
            some degree of reciprocity between encoding and decoding moments, otherwise
            we could not speak of an effective communicative exchange at all. Nevertheless,
            this ‘correspondence’  is not given but constructed.  It  is not  ‘natural’ but the
            product of an articulation between two distinct moments. And the former cannot
            determine or guarantee,  in a simple sense,  which  decoding codes will be
            employed. Otherwise communication would be a perfectly equivalent circuit, and
            every message would be an instance of ‘perfectly transparent communication’.
            We must think, then, of the variant articulations in which encoding/decoding can
            be combined. To  elaborate  on this, we  offer a hypothetical  analysis of some
            possible decoding positions, in order  to  reinforce  the point  of ‘no  necessary
            correspondence’. 14
              We identify three hypothetical positions from which decodings of a televisual
            discourse may be constructed. These need to be empirically tested and refined.
            But the argument that decodings do not follow inevitably from encodings, that they
            are not identical, reinforces the argument of ‘no necessary correspondence’. It
            also helps to deconstruct the common-sense meaning of ‘misunderstanding’ in
            terms of a theory of ‘systematically distorted communication’.
              The  first hypothetical position is  that of the  dominant-hegemonic position.
            When the viewer takes the connoted meaning from, say, a television newscast or
            current affairs programme full and straight, and decodes the message in terms of
            the reference code in which it has been encoded, we might say that the viewer is
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