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172 LANGUAGE

              The difference between the linguistic and the  connotative sign  is not
              between ‘intentional’ and ‘non-intentional’, but a difference founded on
              the varying degrees of openness operating in the different planes’ systemic
              organization…They are both dependent on awareness of the extra-systemic
              referent to which both  systems ultimately refer in the  decoding of their
              respective signs and the realization of the meaning of those signs. 11
            The theoretical  weakness of this  position is that it seems to return to a pre-
            semiological concept of  meaning as  a  transparent reflection of  a taken-for-
            granted ‘material world’. As John Ellis points out in a brief reply to Chambers:
              In this formulation,  language is a mere doubling of the  real world,
              coextensive with it and expressing it without problems…. To concentrate
              on ‘concrete’ objects like this is an oversimplification that even intelligent
              idealists find hard to bear…a word like ‘labour’ or ‘struggle’ does not have
              such a clear, self-evident meaning, and in such cases it is obvious that the
              ‘referent’ and the  signifier are  equally caught  in a process of
              conceptualization. 12
            Chambers’s position  is  actually  contradictory,  since he is at times himself
            working  within a semiological problematic.  In some  of his formulations the
            ‘material world’ is not simply ‘out there’, to be reflected in a signifying system.
            It is,  rather, part of the constitution  of signifying practices  themselves.  This
            perspective seems  to recognize a material construction of ideologies, within
            social institutions, which require socially defined subjective ‘interpretations’. As
            Chambers puts it:
              I  would suggest  it  to  be extremely naive  to understand ideology  as
              something imposed from above. Ideology has to negotiate a path through
              the differential social totality in order to win consensus, and it arises within
              social relationships and particular practices. For instance, whilst waiting at
              the barber’s, I am given a copy of Paris-Match to read. This is not a pure
              moment, but occurs in the ‘common-sense’ world of everyday experiences
              that forms  the framework for my  interpretations. My perceptive and
              cognitive faculties, which are not neutral, but socially and culturally
              acquired, recognize  a French soldier  saluting a  French flag. Thus  my
              perception of that photograph is grounded in norms of societal
              expectancies. Secondly, my ‘reading’ of it is further demarcated. It is not
              any photograph but the cover of Paris-Match; a specific practice with its
              own ideological configurations (‘newsworthiness’, captions, touching up
              photos, etc.).  It  is in the space  between the sedimented perceptual
              appropriation and the contextualized reading that the hegemonic ideology
              passes ‘as though behind men’s backs’. 13
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