Page 199 - Decoding Culture
P. 199

192  D E C O D I N G   C U L TURE
          contemplation of matters cultural. Yet others have seen the theo­
           rizing process as central to the very constitution of 'reality' itself, or,
           not unconnected,  as part  of the  process of 'deconstructing'  the
          worlds  constituted  in  culture.  Others  invoke  'theory' to  decode
           texts, to unpack ideologies, to lend legitimacy and apparent coher­
           ence to judgements of value or moral worth. In the short history of
           cultural studies, the term has been employed to designate a multi­
           tude  of abstractions, generalizations  and  speculations. Y e t rarely
           has anyone stopped to consider the purpose of all this theorizing or
           what relation it might bear to the kind of knowledge that we seek.
           In consequence, those occupying different positions have all too
           often talked past each other - witness some of the 'debates' in the
           recent literature - leaning upon quite  different epistemologies in
           promoting their cases. An outside observer, however benevolently
           disposed,  would  find  it  well  nigh  impossible  to  identify  any
           common epistemological foundation on which the cultural studies
          project is built.
             I have outlined my own position earlier in this chapter, prefer­
           ring an  instrumental  concept of theory  located  within  a broadly
          realist epistemology.  From this point of view,  the  aim  of cultural
           studies is explanatory understanding of the realm of culture: texts,
           readers, and the relation of both to their larger social context. By
           building  abstract  (and  inevitably  simplified)  models  of  these
           processes, we seek to make sense of observed patterns of human
           activity, observations that are made, of course, using methodolog­
           ical  devices  which  are  themselves  theoretically  grounded.
           Provided that the theories on which observations depend are not
           the same as the theories invoked for explanation, circularity can be
           avoided,  and  provided that the  methodologies  applied  are  suffi­
           ciently diverse, the risk of methodological monism is minimized. In
           this way, the models or 'theories' that we generate can be assessed
           against each other as instruments of explanation.





                              Copyrighted Material
   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204