Page 155 - Democracy and the Public Sphere
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150 Jürgen Habermas

                                32.  Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action vol. 1, p. 95.
                                33.  J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action vol. 2: Lifeworld
                                    and System: The Critique of Functionalist Reason, trans. T. McCarthy
                                    (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987[1981]), p. 119.
                                 34.  Ibid., p. 125.
                                 35.  Ibid., p. 124.
                                 36.  Ibid., p. 138.
                                37.  Ibid., pp. 262–3. I acknowledge that I am glossing over Habermas’s deeply
                                    controversial adoption of the vocabulary of systems theory. A forgiving
                                    reading of the system–lifeworld model is one that sees them not as

                                    discrete spheres of society but as signifiers of the relative prevalence
                                    of the various ‘media’ – money, strategic power and communicative
                                    action – in social interactions. See L. Ray, Rethinking Critical Theory:
                                    Emancipation in the Age of Social Movements (London: Sage, 1993).
                                38.  Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action vol. 2, p. 148.
                                 39.  Ibid., p. 180.
                                 40.  Ibid., p. 184.
                                 41.  Ibid., p. 178.
                                 42.  Ibid., pp. 301–2.
                                 43.  Ibid., p. 302.
                                 44.  Ibid., p. 392.
                                 45.  Ibid., p. 394.
                                 46.  Ibid., p. 398.
                                47.  Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity; see also J. Habermas,
                                    Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, trans. W.M. Hohengarten
                                    (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992).
                                48.  Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests.
                                49.  J. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, trans.
                                    C. Cronin and P. de Greiff (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), p. 4.
                                 50.  Ibid., pp. 43–4.
                                51.  J. Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003),
                                    p. 39.
                                52.  Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, p. 43.
                                 53.  Ibid., p. 41 (emphases added).
                                54.  Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, p. 4.
                                 55.  Ibid., p. 73.
                                56.  J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse
                                    Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge: Polity Press,
                                    1996).
                                 57.  J. Habermas, ‘Postscript to Between Facts and Norms’, in M. Defl em (ed.),
                                    Habermas, Modernity and Law (London: Sage, 1996), p. 139.
                                58.  Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, p. 257.
                                 59.  Habermas, ‘Postscript to Between Facts and Norms’, p. 138.
                                 60.  That’s not to say that citizens can be obliged to exercise their public
                                    autonomy communicatively rather than strategically. The point
                                    Habermas is making, however, is that citizens can only hope to bridge
                                    the gap between morality and law (and go beyond the role of mere legal
                                    subjects) if they are open to mutual accommodation in legal norms that
                                    operate at greater and greater levels of abstraction in order to bridge









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