Page 45 - Foundations of Cognitive Psychology : Core Readings

Can Machines Think? 43

explosion. A computer a million times bigger or faster than a human brain
might not look like the brain of a human being, or even be internally organized
like the brain of a human being, but if, for all its differences, it somehow
managed to control a wise and timely set of activities, it would have to be the
beneficiary of a very special design that avoided combinatorial explosion,
and whatever that design was, would we not be right to consider the entity
intelligent?
Turing’s test was designed to allow for this possibility. His point was that we
should not be species-chauvinistic, or anthropocentric, about the insides of an
intelligent being, for there might be inhuman ways of being intelligent.
To my knowledge, the only serious and interesting attempt by any pro-
gram designer to win even a severely modified Turing test has been Kenneth
Colby’s. Colby is a psychiatrist and intelligence artificer at UCLA. He has a
program called PARRY, which is a computer simulation of a paranoid patient
who has delusions about the Mafia being out to get him. As you do with other
conversational programs, you interact with it by sitting at a terminal and
typing questions and answers back and forth. A number of years ago, Colby
put PARRY to a very restricted test. He had genuine psychiatrists interview
PARRY. He did not suggest to them that they might be talking or typing to a
computer; rather, he made up some plausible story about why they were com-
municating with a real live patient by teletype. He also had the psychiatrists
interview real, human paranoids via teletype. Then he took a PARRY tran-
script, inserted it in a group of teletype transcripts from real patients, gave
them to another group of experts—more psychiatrists—and said, ‘‘One of these
was a conversation with a computer. Can you figure out which one it was?’’
They couldn’t. They didn’t do better than chance.
Colby presented this with some huzzah, but critics scoffed at the suggestions
that this was a legitimate Turing test. My favorite commentary on it was Joseph
Weizenbaum’s; in a letter to the Communications of the Association of Computing
Machinery (Weizenbaum, 1974, p. 543), he said that, inspired by Colby, he had
designed an even better program, which passed the same test. His also had the
virtue of being a very inexpensive program, in these times of tight money. In
fact you didn’t even need a computer for it. All you needed was an electric
typewriter. His program modeled infant autism. And the transcripts—you type
in your questions, and the thing just sits there and hums—cannot be distin-
guished by experts from transcripts of real conversations with infantile autistic
patients. What was wrong, of course, with Colby’s test was that the unsus-
pecting interviewers had no motivation at all to try out any of the sorts of
questions that easily would have unmasked PARRY.
Colby was undaunted, and after his team had improved PARRY he put it to
a much more severe test—a surprisingly severe test. This time, the inter-
viewers—again, psychiatrists—were given the task at the outset of telling the
computer from the real patient. They were set up in a classic Turing test:the
patient in one room, the computer PARRY in the other room, with the judges
conducting interviews with both of them (on successive days). The judges’ task
was to find out which one was the computer and which one was the real pa-
tient. Amazingly, they didn’t do much better, which leads some people to say,
‘‘Well, that just confirms my impression of the intelligence of psychiatrists!’’