Page 48 - Foundations of Cognitive Psychology : Core Readings

46 Daniel C. Dennett

very hard to extrapolate accurately from a sample performance that one has
observed to such a system’s total competence. It’s also very hard to keep from
extrapolating much too generously.
While I was visiting Schank’s laboratory in the spring of 1980, something
revealing happened. The real Cyrus Vance resigned suddenly. The effect on the
program CYRUS was chaotic. It was utterly unable to cope with the flood of
‘‘unusual’’ news about Cyrus Vance. The only sorts of episodes CYRUS could
understand at all were diplomatic meetings, flights, press conferences, state
dinners, and the like—less than two dozen general sorts of activities (the kinds
that are newsworthy and typical of secretaries of state). It had no provision
for sudden resignation. It was as if the UPI had reported that a wicked witch
had turned Vance into a frog. It is distinctly possible that CYRUS would have
takenthatreportmorein stridethatthe actual news.One canimagine the
conversation:
Q: Hello, Mr.Vance,what’s new?
A:I was turned into a frog yesterday.

Butof courseitwouldn’tknowenoughabout what it hadjustwritten to be
puzzled, or startled, or embarrassed. The reason is obvious. When you look
inside CYRUS, you find that it has skeletal definitions of thousands of words,
but these definitions are minimal. They contain as little as the system designers
think that they can get away with. Thus, perhaps, lawyer wouldbedefinedas
synonymous with attorney and legal counsel, but aside from that, all one would
discover about lawyers is that they are adult human beings and that they per-
form various functions in legal areas. If you then traced out the path to human
being, you’d find out various obvious things CYRUS ‘‘knew’’ about human
beings (hence aboutlawyers), butthatisnot alot.Thatlawyers areuniver-
sity graduates, that they are better paid than chambermaids, that they know
how to tie their shoes, that they are unlikely to be found in the company of
lumberjacks—these trivial, if weird, facts about lawyers would not be explicit
or implicit anywhere in this system. In other words, a very thin stereotype of a
lawyer would be incorporated into the system, so that almost nothing you
could tell it about a lawyer would surprise it.
So long as surprising things don’t happen, so long as Mr. Vance, for instance,
leads a typical diplomat’s life, attending state dinners, giving speeches, flying
from Cairo to Rome, and so forth, this system works very well. But as soon as
his path is crossed by an important anomaly, the system is unable to cope, and
unable to recover without fairly massive human intervention. In the case of the
sudden resignation, Kolodner and her associates soon had CYRUS up and
running again, with a new talent—answering questions about Edmund Muskie,
Vance’s successor—but it was no less vulnerable to unexpected events. Not
that it mattered particularly since CYRUS was a theoretical model, not a prac-
tical system.
There are a host of ways of improving the performance of such systems, and
of course, some systems are much better than others. But all AI programs in
one way or another have this facade-like quality, simply for reasons of econ-
omy. For instance, most expert systems in medical diagnosis so far developed
operate with statistical information. They have no deep or even shallow