Page 53 - Foundations of Cognitive Psychology : Core Readings

Can Machines Think? 51

The lowly lobster is, in one regard, self-conscious. If you want to know
whether or not you can create that on the computer, the answer is yes. It’s no
trouble at all. The computer is already a self-watching, self-monitoring sort of
thing. That is an established part of the technology.
But, of course, most people have something more in mind when they speak
of self-consciousness. It is that special inner light, that private way that it is
with you that nobody else can share, something that is forever outside the
bounds of computer science. How could a computer ever be conscious in this
sense?
That belief, that very gripping, powerful intuition is, I think, in the end sim-
ply an illusion of common sense. It is as gripping as the common-sense illusion
that the earth stands still and the sun goes around the earth. But the only way
that those of us who do not believe in the illusion will ever convince the general
public that it is an illusion is by gradually unfolding a very difficult and fasci-
nating story about just what is going on in our minds.
In the interim, people like me—philosophers who have to live by our wits
and tell a lot of stories—use what I call intuition pumps, little examples that
help free up the imagination. I simply want to draw your attention to one fact.
If you look at a computer—I don’t care whether it’s a giant Cray or a personal
computer—if you open up the box and look inside and see those chips, you
say, ‘‘No way could that be conscious. No way could that be self-conscious.’’
But the same thing is true if you take the top off somebody’s skull and look at
the gray matter pulsing away in there. You think, ‘‘That is conscious? No way
could that lump of stuff be conscious.’’
Of course, it makes no difference whether you look at it with a microscope or
with a macroscope:At no level of inspection does a brain look like the seat of
consciousness. Therefore, don’t expect a computer to look like the seat of con-
sciousness. If you want to get a grasp of how a computer could be conscious,
it’s no more difficult in the end than getting a grasp of how a brain could be
conscious.
As we develop good accounts of consciousness, it will no longer seem so ob-
vious to everyone that the idea of a self-conscious computer is a contradiction
in terms. At the same time, I doubt that there will ever be self-conscious robots.
But for boring reasons. There won’t be any point in making them. Theoreti-
cally, could we make a gall bladder out of atoms? In principle we could. A gall
bladder is just a collection of atoms, but manufacturing one would cost the
moon. It would be more expensive than every project NASA has ever dreamed
of, and there would be no scientific payoff. We wouldn’t learn anything new
about how gall bladders work. For the same reason, I don’t think we’re going
to see really humanoid robots, because practical, cost-effective robots don’t
need to be very humanoid at all. They need to be like the robots you can
already see at General Motors, or like boxy little computers that do special-
purpose things.
The theoretical issues will be studied by artificial intelligence researchers by
looking at models that, to the layman, will show very little sign of humanity at
all, and it will be only by rather indirect arguments that anyone will be able to