Page 55 - Foundations of Cognitive Psychology : Core Readings

Can Machines Think? 53

faulty briefing of the confederates, several of them gave deliberately clunky,
automaton-like answers. It turned out that they had decided to give the silicon
contestants a sporting chance by acting as if they were programs! But once
we’d straightened out these glitches in the rules and procedures, the competi-
tion worked out just as I had originally predicted:the computers stood out like
sore thumbs even though there were still huge restrictions on topic. In the third
year, two of the judges—journalists—each made a false negative judgment,
declaring one of the less eloquent human confederates to be a computer. On
debriefing, their explanation showed just how vast the gulf was between the
computer programs and the people:they reasoned that the competition would
not have been held if there weren’t at least one halfway decent computer con-
testant, so they simply picked the least impressive human being and declared it
to be a computer. But they could see the gap between the computers and the
people as well as everybody else could.
The Loebner Prize Competition was a fascinating social experiment, and
some day I hope to write up the inside story—a tale of sometimes hilarious
misadventure, bizarre characters, interesting technical challenges, and more.
But it never succeeded in attracting serious contestants from the world’s best
AI labs. Why not? In part because, as the essay argues, passing the Turing test
is not a sensible research and development goal for serious AI. It requires too
much Disney and not enough science. We might have corrected that flaw by
introducing into the Loebner Competition something analogous to the ‘‘school
figures’’ in ice-skating competition:theoretically interesting (but not crowd-
pleasing) technical challenges such as parsing pronouns, or dealing creatively
with enthymemes (arguments with unstated premises). Only those programs
that performed well in the school figures—the serious competition—would be
permitted into the final show-off round, where they could dazzle and amuse
the onlookers with some cute Disney touches. Some such change in the rules
would have wiped out all but the most serious and dedicated of the home
hobbyists, and made the Loebner Competition worth winning (and not too
embarrassing to lose). When my proposals along these lines were rejected,
however, I resigned from the committee. The annual competitions continue,
apparently, under the direction of Hugh Loebner. On the World Wide Web I
just found the transcript of the conversation of the winning program in the 1996
completion. It was a scant improvement over 1991, still a bag of cheap tricks
with no serious analysis of the meaning of the sentences. The Turing test is too
difficult for the real world.

Notes
Originally appeared in Shafto, M., ed., How We Know (San Francisco:Harper & Row, 1985).
1. I thank Kenneth Colby for providing me with the complete transcripts (including the Judges’
commentaries and reactions), from which these exchanges are quoted. The first published ac-
count of the experiment is Heiser et al. (1980, pp. 149–162). Colby (1981, pp. 515–560) discusses
PARRY and its implications.

References
Block, N. (1982). ‘‘Psychologism and Behaviorism,’’ Philosophical Review, 90, pp. 5–43.
Colby, K. M. (1981). ‘‘Modeling a Paranoid Mind,’’ Behavioral & Brain Sciences 4(4).