Page 51 - Foundations of Cognitive Psychology : Core Readings

Can Machines Think? 49

genuine understanding of a rich and intimate perceptual interconnection be-
tween an entity and its surrounding world—the need for something like eyes
and ears—and a similarly complex active engagement with elements in that
world—the need for something like hands with which to do things in that
world. Moreover, I have often held that only a biography of sorts, a history of
actual projects, learning experiences, and other bouts with reality, could pro-
duce the sorts of complexities (both external, or behavioral, and internal) that
are needed to ground a principled interpretation of an entity as a thinking
thing, an entity with beliefs, desires, intentions, and other mental attitudes.
But the opaque screen in the Turing test discounts or dismisses these factors
altogether, it seems, by focusing attention on only the contemporaneous ca-
pacity to engage in one very limited sort of activity:verbal communication.
(I have coined a pejorative label for such purely language-using systems:bed-
ridden.) Am I going back on my earlier claims? Not at all. I am merely pointing
out that the Turing test is so powerful that it will ensure indirectly that these
conditions, if they are truly necessary, are met by any successful contestant.
‘‘You may well be right,’’ Turing could say, ‘‘that eyes, ears, hands, and a
history are necessary conditions for thinking. If so, then I submit that nothing
could pass the Turing test that didn’t have eyes, ears, hands, and a history.
That is an empirical claim, which we can someday hope to test. If you suggest
that these are conceptually necessary, not just practically or physically neces-
sary, conditions for thinking, you make a philosophical claim that I for one
would not know how, or care, to assess. Isn’t it more interesting and important
in the end to discover whether or not it is true that no bedridden system could
pass a demanding Turing test?’’
Suppose we put to Turing the suggestion that he add another component to
his test:Not only must an entity win the imitation game, but also must be able
to identify—using whatever sensory apparatus it has available to it—a variety
of familiar objects placed in its room:a tennis racket, a potted palm, a bucket of
yellow paint, a live dog. This would ensure that somehow the other entity was
capable of moving around and distinguishing things in the world. Turing could
reply, I am asserting, that this is an utterly unnecessary addition to his test,
making it no more demanding than it already was. A suitable probing conver-
sation would surely establish, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the contestant
knew its way around the world. The imagined alternative of somehow ‘‘pres-
tocking’’ a bedridden, blind computer with enough information, and a clever
enough program, to trick the Turing test is science fiction of the worst kind—
possible ‘‘in principle’’ but not remotely possible in fact, given the combinato-
rial explosion of possible variation such a system would have to cope with.
‘‘But suppose you’re wrong. What would you say of an entity that was cre-
ated all at once (by some programmers, perhaps), an instant individual with all
the conversational talents of an embodied, experienced human being?’’ This is
like the question:‘‘Would you call a hunk of H 2 O that was as hard as steel
at room temperature ice?’’ I do not know what Turing would say, of course,
so I will speak for myself. Faced with such an improbable violation of what I
take to be the laws of nature, I would probably be speechless. The least of my
worries would be about which lexicographical leap to take: